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I. INTRODUCTION
Current congressional consideration of the Proposed Federal
Criminal Code' comes at a time of increasing public concern over
concerning the Proposed Federal Criminal Code have been printed in thirteen parts. Refer-
ences in this Note to the following parts will be cited as Subcommittee Hearings, pt. -.
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S.1437, S. 31, S. 45, S. 181, S. 204, S.
260, S. 888, S. 979, & S. 1221 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. xII (1977); Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1 & S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. XI (1974);
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings.on S. 1 & S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. X (1974); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1, S. 716 & S. 1400 Before
the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. VI (1973); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on S. 1, S.
716, S. 1400 & S. 1401 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. V (1973); Reform of the Federal Criminal
Laws: Hearings on Policy Questions Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. III, subpts. A-D (1972);
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on the Report of the National Commission
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1971).
1. Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. [hereinafter cited
as Proposed Code], reprinted in Subcommittee Hearings, pt. XIII, at 9485. The Proposed
Code represents the culmination of more than a decade of study, drafting, and debate to
revise Title 18 and consolidate the scattered provisions of the United States Code dealing with
criminal liability. In 1966 Congress established the National Commission on Reform of Fed-
eral Criminal Laws, composed of lawyers, judges, and legislators, and chaired by former
Governor Edmund G. Brown. Charged with the responsibility of conducting a full and com-
plete review of federal criminal law and submitting recommended legislation, the Commis-
sion, its Advisory Committee, consultants, and staff produced a study draft for a new Federal
Criminal Code in 1970 (NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY
DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970) [hereinafter cited as STUDY DRAFT]), and
later completed a recommended code which it forwarded to the President and Congress in
1971 (NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]). Over the next two years, the Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Committee held several hearings on the
Proposed Code, and legislation was introduced to the Senate on January 4, 1973. See S. 1,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Subcommittee Hearings, pt. V, at 4211. The Nixon
Administration introduced its own proposed code on March 27, 1973. See S. 1400, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Subcommittee Hearings, pt. V, at 4862. The bills were eventu-
ally consolidated, and following two years of continued hearings, debate, and amendment,
another Proposed Code was introduced on January 15, 1975. See S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 1 (1975)]. After two more years of controversy concerning the
proposal's treatment of such issues as 'ederal jurisdiction, gun control, wiretapping, capital
punishment, sentencing procedures, and criminal sanctions against the media, Senators
McClellan and Kennedy submitted the present Proposed Code as a compromise on May 2,
1977. For a discussion of the tortured history of the Proposed Code and the attendant politics,
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corporate crime.2 The societal harm resulting from criminal misuse
and abuse of the corporate form is obvious,3 but the proper alloca-
tion of criminal responsibility between the corporation and its indi-
vidual agents' has proven to be an elusive goal.5 Although an early
reluctance by the law to accept the concept that a corporation could
see Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics and Prospects, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 171, 171-82, 220-24; Mathews & Sullivan, Criminal Liability for Violations of the Federal
Securities Laws: The National Commission's Proposed Federal Criminal Code, S. 1, and S.
1400, 11 AM. CriM. L. REV. 883, 883-86 (1973).
2. See generally Symposium-White-Collar Crime, 11 Am. Crim. L. REv. 817 (1973).
One commentator concludes that recent news accounts of corporate bribes, slush funds, and
illegal political contributions indicate that corporate crime is a normal occurrence in the
American business community. See Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy
Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73, 73 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Elkins]. According to consumer
advocate Ralph Nader, the nation is suffering an "economic corporate crime wave." See
Subcommittee Hearings, pt. I, subpt. D, at 2991.
3. The societal harms created by corporations include pollution; manufacture and dis-
tribution of dangerous consumer products; consumer frauds; and the harmful economic con-
sequences of monopolistic practices, restraint of trade, and unfair trade practices. Professor
Elkins concludes that higher consumer costs, increased pollution, and more frequent physical
injuries produced by criminal corporate activities constitute a societal harm that far exceeds
the harm caused by individual criminals. See Elkins, supra note 2, at 74-75.
4. "Agent" is defined by § 111 of the Proposed Code to include a partner, director,
officer, manager, servant, employee, or any other person authorized to act on behalf of the
organization. In civil corporation law, important distinctions exist between directors, officers,
and other agents. Executive officers usually are required by the corporate charter and ap-
pointed by the board of directors to speak and act for the corporation in furthering its
objectives. Employees are merely the agents hired by the officers. However, most courts use
the terms "officers," "directors," "agents," and "employees" indiscriminately, and the Pro-
posed Code generally makes no express distinctions between the legal significance of the
various levels of "agents." See W. F r=HcE, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORArIONS
§ 266 (rev. perm. ed. 1975). This Note will primarily consider the liability of agents at the
managerial and supervisory levels, including officers and directors.
5. Although it is settled that corporations are subject to criminal sanctions, see note 6
infra, debate continues concerning the propriety of criminal fines against corporations. Oppo-
nents of corporate criminal liability assert that criminal convictions against a corporation
provide no deterrence for the conduct of individuals within the organization. In addition,
imposing criminal penalties on the corporation results in a vicarious punishment of the
shareholders and creditors, who bear the burden of paying the fine. Supporters of corporate
liability contend that corporations are concerned about their "corporate image," and that the
possibility of adverse publicity surrounding a criminal conviction may coerce individuals
within the entity into controlling harmful conduct. In addition, prosecuting individuals but
not corporations creates a double standard in law enforcement. See generally W. LAFAvE &
A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 33, at 232 (1972); Elkins, supra note 2, at 78-82; Note, Is Corporate
Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 917-27 (1975); MODEL PENAL CODE: §
2.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
The Proposed Code attempts to control corporate misconduct by providing sanctions
against both the corporation and "responsible" officials. Of course, the challenge is to deter-
mine who the "responsible" officials are. Individuals responsible for illegal acts often do not
leave sufficient evidence of their identity, and the tendency of corporate structures to mask
and diffuse responsibility further complicates identification of the culpable parties. See Sub-
committee Hearings, pt. XI, at 7873 (statement of Ralph Nader); Elkins, supra note 2, at
82-83.
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be guilty of a crime has all but dissipated,' organizational culpabil-
ity without corresponding criminal liability for the individuals
within the corporate structure engaging in the illegal conduct ig-
nores the common-sense observation that a corporation can act,
illegally or otherwise, only through its agents. Nonetheless, juries
have frequently found corporate defendants criminally culpable
while acquitting agents who clearly committed the criminal acts.7
This phenomenon perhaps reflects an intuitive feeling by jurors that
individuals acting within the pressures of a bureaucratic and some-
times highly diffuse corporate structure are often unwitting or even
unwilling participants in an illegal transaction, and that a criminal
conviction is too harsh a sanction for business misconduct that is
not of a highly immoral or detestable character.'
6. At early common law, a corporation could not be guilty of a crime because it had no
mind capable of harboring criminal intent nor body capable of being imprisoned. Modern law
overcomes this metaphysical obstacle by "imputing" both the acts and the criminal intent
of corporate agents to the corporation. One theoretical basis of corporate culpability is the
"superior agent" theory, which imputes to the corporation the acts and criminal intent of
officers sufficiently high in the corporate structure that their actions may be considered the
acts of the corporation itself. Courts seeking to impute to the corporation the conduct of lower
officials and employees attempt to find some "link" between the subordinate agent and the
"inner-circle" of managers and directors, such as authorization or acquiescence. See generally
LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 5, § 33; Elkins, supra note 2, at 99-106; Note, supra note 5, at
908.
The trend in federal courts, however, reflects an abandonment of the "superior agent"
theory. The general rule is that most acts and the accompanying mens rea of any agent acting
within the scope of his employment and on behalf of the corporation may be imputed to the
corporation. See generally LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 5, § 33; Elkins, supra note 2, at 105-
19; Note, supra note 5, at 910-11. The Proposed Code continues the broad concept of corporate
criminal liability that federal courts presently apply. Section 402(a)(1) holds the corporation
liable for an offense if the conduct constituting the offense is the conduct of an agent occurring
"in the performance of matters within the scope of the agent's employment or within the
scope of the agent's actual, implied, or apparent authority." If the agent's acts are outside
the scope of his employment or authority, the corporation nevertheless may be liable under
§ 402(a)(2) if the corporation ratifies or adopts the agent's conduct. Section 402(b), which
imposes liability for the failure of the organization or its agent to "discharge a specific duty
of conduct imposed on the organization by law," is discussed in connection with § 403(b) in
the text accompanying notes 145-55 infra.
7. E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 411 (7th Cir. 1941) ("We
can not understand how the jury could have acquitted all of the individual defendants.").
See also cases cited in Elkins, supra note 2, at 83 n.29. Occasionally, the individual defendant
but not the organization is convicted. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
8. The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code observed that the tendency of jurors to
convict the corporate defendant but acquit the obviously guilty agents who committed the
acts
may reflect more than faulty or capricious judgment on the part of juries. It may repre-
sent a recognition that the social consequences of a criminal conviction may fall with a
disproportionately heavy impact or the individual defendants where the conduct in-
volved is not of a highly immoral character. It may also reflect a shrewd belief that the
violation may have been produced by pressures on the subordinates created by corporate
managerial officials even though the latter may not have intended or desired the crimi-
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Recent events, however, indicate that prosecutorial policy and
jury predilections will produce more prosecutions and convictions of
individuals in the future.' Although the criminal law applies most
readily to the individual actors performing the criminal conduct,
effective deterrence of corporate crime often requires imposing lia-
bility upon supervisory and managerial corporate officials, but not
upon subordinate agents who, although committing a proscribed
activity, were in fact powerless to realize the results of or to prevent
the blameworthy corporate conduct.10 In identifying the appropriate
individuals within the corporate structure who should bear the
criminal responsibility for illegal conduct in furtherance of a corpo-
rate purpose, the Proposed Federal Criminal Code provides for
criminal sanctions against agents who commit the particular acts
constituting the offense as well as supervisory and managerial offi-
cials who are in a position to control the actions of their subordi-
nates. Section 403 of the Proposed Code imposes responsibility for
illegal organizational" conduct on individuals who actually perform
the offensive acts,'" who fail to insure that the corporation fulfills a
duty imposed by law, 13 and who permit or contribute to an offense
by their reckless failure to supervise corporate activities."
nal behavior and even though the pressures can only be sensed rather than demon-
strated.
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 2.07, Comment at 149. Pointing out that all the cited
cases in which the corporation is convicted but the obviously guilty agent goes free are
violations of economic regulations, the Model Penal Code's official commentary suggests that
a different verdict might be reached if the offenses involved a more obvious moral element.
Id.
The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, supra note 1, expressed
doubts about the efficacy of criminal sanctions against individuals involved in violations of
regulatory statutes, especially in view of the great increase of regulations "commanding
affirmative acts or forbidding behavior not condemned by generally recognized ethical stan-
dards." See FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at § 1006, Comment, Declaration of Policy.
9. Federal prosecutions and convictions of corporate officials are increasing in response
to judicial and public disfavor of "white-collar" crimes. See Curnow, Economic Crimes: A
High Standard of Care, 35 FED. B.J. 21, 29 (1976).
10. The complexities, size, and bureaucratic structure of the modern corporation exac-
erbate the problem of identifying guilty individuals and establishing their criminal liability.
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 2.07. See also note 5 supra. Although sufficient evidence
for indictment of identifiable employees within the lower levels of the corporate hierarchy
exists, it may be fundamentally unfair to proceed against subordinates but not their complici-
tous supervisors or management personnel. Elkins, supra note 2, at 83.
11. Section 403 of the Proposed Code covers the liability of an agent for the conduct of
his "organization." Under § 111 of the Proposed Code, "organization" means any legal entity,
other than a government, organized for any purpose, and includes corporations, companies,
associations, partnerships, foundations, trusts, unions, clubs, churches, and "any other asso-
ciation of persons." Because the legislative history indicates that the primary target of § 403
is corporate crime, this Note focuses upon business organizations.
12. Proposed Code, supra note 1, § 403(a).
13. Id. § 403(b).
14. Id. § 403(c).
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This Note will discuss the development and current status of
state and federal law dealing with individual liability for corporate
crime. Following a discussion of the goals of the general provisions
describing individual liability in the Proposed Code, this Note will
analyze each subsection of section 403, suggest standards for their
application in light of the legislative goals, and finally propose pos-
sible defenses and limitations to individual culpability.*
II. CuLPABiLrry OF INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE CORPORATION UNDER
STATE LAW
When the agent directly responsibile for the criminal conduct
of the corporation can be easily identified, prosecution presents few
conceptual problems, and only the propriety of imposing the crimi-
nal sanction on such an agent need be considered. 5 Additional at-
tempts to impose liability on the superiors of the acting agents or
to hold high-ranking corporate officials responsible for corporate
activities in the absence of clearly identifiable actors presents the
danger of introducing vicarious liability,"6 which is imposed on cor-
porations 7 for the actions of subordinate agents, into the area of
individual liability. 8 State courts strive to avoid vicarious liability
by identifying indicia of participation by the corporate official in the
criminal conduct of subordinates though the indicia identified are
often somewhat fictional. Liability thus attaches because of the
15. See notes 8 & 10 supra and accompanying text. Often the easily identifiable actors
clearly are not the appropriate targets of criminal prosecution. As the court said in State ex
rel. Kropf v. Gilbert, 213 Wis. 196, 228, 251 N.W. 478, 489 (1933); "Responsibility for corpo-
rate acts rests with those who have the power to authorize and control such acts [of conver-
sion] and not with those who, without knowledge of the fraud, upon the authorization of the
corporation and at the direction of a superior officer, perform the physical acts which may
result in conversion." This selectivity is probably more a matter of prosecutorial discretion,
however, because it is no defense for an individual who commits an affirmative wrongful act
that corporate management ordered him to perform the act. State v. Monteleone, 63 N.J.
Super. 596, 600-01, 165 A.2d 39, 41 (1960), aff'd, 36 N.J. 93, 175 A.2d 207 (1961); People v.
Trapp, 20 N.Y.2d 613, 617, 233 N.E.2d 110, 112, 286 N.Y.S.2d 11, 14 (1967).
16. Vicarious liability is liability imposed upon a defendant for the misconduct of
another, even though the defendant neither possessed the mens rea nor committed the actus
reus required for conviction. Statutes regulating businesses and holding employers culpable
for the acts of their employees frequently employ vicarious liability. See LAFAvE & ScoTr,
supra note 5, § 32.
17. See note 6 supra. Because the actions and criminal intent of agents are imputed to
the corporate entity, corporate criminal liability is a form of vicarious liability. See LAFAvE
& ScoTr, supra note 5, § 33. See also Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability (pt. 1), 28 COLUM. L.
Rzv. 1, 13 (1928).
18. Because criminal liability is basically an individual and personal concern, courts
demand an explicit statutory command before holding a person liable for the actions of
another. See State v. Nelson, 83 S.D. 655, 660, 165 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1969); LAFAvE & SCOTr,
supra note 5, § 32.
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personal misconduct" of the defendant, manifested by: (1) active
participation in the offense as an aider, abetter, or accomplice; (2)
"passive" participation through knowledge, or the opportunity to
gain knowledge, of the offense, and presumed subsequent acquiesc-
ence in the offense; or (3) failure to fulfill a duty to control corporate
actions.20
A. Liability for Conduct in a Representative Capacity
State courts have always been hostile to pleas by corporate
agents that they committed illegal conduct while acting for the
corporation in a "representative capacity," rendering them non-
culpable as individuals under criminal statutes.2' Rejection of the
representative capacity defense by the courts represents judicial
recognition and disapproval of the attempts of sole proprietors or
owners of small businesses to escape criminal liability by creating
a corporate "alter ego" for use as an instrumentality for personally
conducting illegal activity.22 When the individual defendant is the
"sole executing mind" of the corporation.s or dominates the corpora-
tion and manipulates it for criminal purposes,24 the courts have
little trouble in applying criminal statutes to corporate officers and
agents acting in their official or "representative" capacity. As a
general rule, state courts will impose criminal liability on corporate
agents who, having any requisite criminal intent, personally per-
form or directs the acts constituting the offenses. The corporate
19. Of course, the misconduct need not always be accompanied by a criminal intent.
Corporate officials as well as the corporation are liable without a culpable state of mind for
violation of strict liability offenses. See, e.g., State v. Burnam, 71 Wash. 199, 128 P. 218
(1912), discussed at notes 35-36 infra and accompanying text. See also note 31 infra.
20. There is a good summary of the law by the court in People v. Alrich Restaurant
Corp. 53 Misc. 2d 574, 575-77, 279 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626-28 (Dist. Ct. 1967). See also FLETCHER,
supra note 4, at §§ 1348-49.
21. See, e.g., State v. Cooley, 141 Tenn. 33, 206 S.W. 182 (1918). The president of a
grocery company was charged with violating a state law that penalized the fraudulent obtain-
ing of goods and credit by means of a check backed by insufficient funds. The defendant
claimed that the statute did not apply to him because he presented the check in his "official
capacity" as president of the company. The court rejected the defense, noting that there is
"no doctrine of agency in the criminal law which will permit an officer of a corporation to
shield himself from criminal responsibility for his own act on the ground that it was the act
of the corporation and not his personal act." Id. at 38, 206 S.W. at 184.
22. See State v. Picheco, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 584, 587, 203 A.2d 242, 244 (App. Div. 1964);
State v. McBride, 215 Minn. 123, 130-31, 9 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1943).
23. See State v. Picheco, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 584, 587, 203 A.2d 242, 244 (App. Div. 1964)
(defendant was the president, treasurer, and majority stockholder of the corporation, and he
controlled its operations); State v. Pincus, 41 N.J. Super. 454, 458, 125 A.2d 420, 422 (1956).
24. See State v. McBride, 215 Minn. 123, 130-31, 9 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1943).
25. See State v. Thomas, 123 Wash. 299, 212 P. 253 (1923). Unlike State v. Cooley, 141
Tenn. 33, 206 S.W. 182 (1918), in which the defendant had personally passed a bad check,
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official who is the "actual, present, and efficient actor"26 within the
corporate hierarchy incurs liability despite his attempts to describe
his conduct as that of the corporation. 7
B. Liability as a Participant
When prosecution reaches corporate officials other than agents
who are the easily identifiable actors, or when the prosecution
charges superiors for the actions of subordinates, state courts have
preferred to base liability upon a showing of the individual defen-
dant's "participation" in the offense, often relying upon concepts of
accessory or accomplice liability, especially aiding and abetting." In
State v. McBride,21 for example, the court held that the manager of
the corporation owning a drug store could be liable as "an aider,
abettor, or accessory" in the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor by a
store clerk despite the defendant's ignorance of the sale and despite
the corporate officer in State v. Thomas did not personally receive funds that he allegedly
arranged to be misappropriated, but instead employees acting under his general directions
received the funds. Id. at 303, 212 P. at 254. The corporate official's direction that an act be
performed might be inferred from his acquiescence in the act by subordinates. See State ex
rel. Kropf v. Gilbert, 213 Wis. 196, 216-17, 251 N.W. 478, 485 (1933).
26. State v. Picheco, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 584, 587, 203 A.2d 242, 244 (App. Div. 1964).
27. See People v. Alrich Restaurant Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 574, 575, 279 N.Y.S.2d 624, 627
(Dist. Ct. 1967) ("man in charge" who is actually conducting the business cannot escape
responsibility for a crime by pleading agency).
28. In felony cases the common law distinguished the criminal actor (principal in the
first degree) from those who ordered, counseled, encouraged, or otherwise aided or abetted
the act. All aiders and abettors of misdemeanors were indictable for the offense as principals.
The distinction has been abolished in most states and in federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)
(1976); Proposed Code, supra note 1, § 404(a); LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 5, § 63, at 496,
Lee, supra note 17, at 24-28. Professor Lee described the doctrine that an individual might
aid and abet or conspire with a nonhuman entity as "one of those peculiar judicial fancies
that, were it not for the desirable results often achieved by their use, would be unqualifiedly
condemned by all save those whose naive faith in the metaphysician's logic cannot be dis-
turbed by earthly facts." Id. at 25.
The theory of accessory liability proved useful when a statute purportedly applied only
to the corporation. For example, in State v. Fraser, 105 Or. 589, 209 P. 467 (1922), a corpora-
tion offered for public sale unregistered stock in violation of the State's Blue Sky law. Al-
though the court apparently assumed that the statute fixed liability only upon the corpora-
tion, the court noted that the corporation's president had acted "jointly and together" with
the offending corporation, and had "actively participated" in the proscribed sales. Because
Oregon law specifically provided that all persons concerned in the commission of a crime,
either by directly committing the act or by aiding and abetting, had to be indicted as
"principals," the court stated that "a person who cannot alone commit a crime defined by
the statute may, by aiding and abetting a person within the class against which the statute
is directed, render himself criminally liable." Id. at 593, 209 P. at 468. Section 404(b)(1) of
the Proposed Code reflects this rule by providing that it is not a defense to a prosecution under
the complicity provisions that the defendant "does not belong to the category of persons who
by definition are' the only persons capable of committing the offense directly." See text
accompanying note 225 infra.
29. 215 Minn. 123, 9 N.W.2d 416 (1943).
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his absence from the store at the time of the illegal transaction.
Because the defendant was the active manager of the business, the
court charged him with constructive knowledge of, and thus partici-
pation in, the offense. 30
Cases enforcing public welfare statutes that seek to protect
health or safety and dispense with the requirement of criminal in-
tent"1 often find individual defendants liable without discussing the
indicia of their participation in the offense or the inference of knowl-
edge of the misconduct of subordinate agents. 3 The source of such
liability for criminal corporate activity is the failure to fulfill a duty,
concomitant with an authoritative position in the corporate hier-
archy, to learn of and prevent violations occurring in the corpora-
tion.3  State courts reason that nonaction constitutes, in theory at
least, a type of participation in the offense. 34 For example, in State
v. Burnam,3 the court held that a state statute prohibiting the sale
of watered milk encompassed the managing agent of the corporate
producer of the milk, without proof of his participation or presence
at the time of the shipment of the offending milk. The court rea-
soned that the manager had "practical control" of the plant opera-
tions and thus had a duty to see that the corporation obeyed the
law.31
Some cases represent a hybrid between the concept that re-
sponsible corporate officials have a duty to act to prevent corporate
violations of the law and the notion that the law charges them with
knowledge of and thus participation in illegal activity by subordi-
30. Id. at 129-31, 9 N.W.2d at 419-20. The court's suspicion that the defendant used
the company as his criminal "alter ego" was an acknowledged factor in its resolution of the
case. Id. at 131, 9 N.W.2d at 420. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
31. Public welfare offenses are an outgrowth of the burgeoning mass of statutory regula-
tions imposed on businesses dealing with food and drugs, selling intoxicating liquors, or
threatening the safety or health of the community. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare
Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. Rav. 55, 70-73 (1933). This Note will describe offenses in which no
proof of motive, intent, wilfulness, knowledge, or other culpable state of mind is required as
"strict liability" offenses. See LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 5, § 20, at 144.
32. For example, in People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 46 N.W. 735
(1890), a criminal nuisance action, the court held that the high-level corporate officers as well
as the corporation were culpable even though the officers may not have been present on the
premises or engaged in any activity when the nuisance was created. The court reasoned that
the directors and officers were the persons "primarily responsible" for work carried on by
employees, and therefore were the "proper ones" to be prosecuted. Id. at 479, 46 N.W. at 737.
33. See generally Lee, supra note 17, at 18-22, and cases cited therein.
34. At common law a defendant could become an accomplice by failing to prevent a
crime when he had a duty to do so. LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 5, § 64.
35. 71 Wash. 199, 128 P. 218 (1912).
36. Id. at 200-02, 128 P. at 219-20. Evidence of defendant's practical control included
his position as general manager, his power to hire and discharge all employees, and his general
supervision over the mixing of the milk. Id. at 200, 128 P. at 219.
1978]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:965
nates.37 The twin elements of duty and knowledge appear in cases
dealing with both strict liability and mens rea offenses. In State ex
rel. Kropf v. Gilbert,3 the court discussed the potential liability of
the directors of an investment house for criminal charges stemming
from the misappropriation of proceeds entrusted by a customer.39
Seeking indicia of participation by the individual defendants in the
conversion,40 the court examined the corporate charter and bylaws
and concluded that the board of directors had authority over and
responsibility for the proper disbursement of all funds." The basis
37. See, e.g., United States v. Laffal, 83 A.2d 871 (D.C. 1951). The court held that the
president of a corporation owning a restaurant alleged to be a disorderly house could be
prosecuted despite the lack of any evidence that he was present when the violations occurred
or had knowledge of them. Recognizing the "general rule" that an officer is not liable for acts
of the corporation performed through agents not acting under his direction or with his permis-
sion, the court cited People v. Detroit White Lead Works, discussed at note 32 supra, and
State v. McBride, discussed in text accompanying notes 29-30 supra, for the proposition that
a directing head of a corporation engaged in an unlawful business may be liable for acts of
subordinates done in the normal course of business, without evidence of the defendant's
supervision or presence. There was a "fair inference," according to the court, that the presi-
dent of the corporation, as its chief executive officer, was acquainted with the illegal conduct
of the business.
In Overland Cotton Mill Co. v. People, 32 Colo. 263, 75 P. 924 (1904), lower echelon
personnel had hired a child in violation of the state child labor law. The court affirmed the
conviction of the assistant superintendent of the mill where the child was employed because
of his active involvement in the management of the mill and his authority to hire and
discharge employees. The court said:
It thus appears from the testimony that by reason of his relationship to the company,
and the performance of his duties, he either knew, or, by the exercise of due diligence
upon his part, should have known, that a minor under the prohibited age was in the
employ of the company. For this reason he must be held as having violated the statute,
for it was within his power, by virtue of the relationship he bore to the company, to have
prevented the employment.
Id. at 269, 75 P. at 926. But see Commonwealth v. Morakis, 208 Pa. Super. 180, 220 A.2d 900
(1966) (in which the court, on similar facts, articulated the issue in terms of vicarious liability
and exonerated the owner of an enterprise who was out of town when the minor was hired).
See also note 16 supra.
38. 213 Wis. 196, 251 N.W. 479 (1933).
39. The charge originally included an allegation of aiding and abetting the conversion
and embezzlement perpetrated by the president of the company. The court concluded that
the president had not committed the crime and that the statute did not apply to the corpora-
tion because the corporation could not commit a felony under existing state law. See note 6
supra. Therefore, the directors and other officers charged could not be liable under the
principles of accessory liability because there was no culpable principal. 213 Wis. at 210-13,
251 N.W. at 483-84. See also note 28 supra. Having rejected accessory liability, the court went
on to discuss the possibility that the defendants were liable individually for conversion. 213
Wis. at 213, 251 N.W. at 484.
40. The court carefully distinguished their holding from cases imposing liability for
aiding and abetting, in which "something more than a mere standing by, or a mere failure
to attempt to prevent the commission of a crime" is required. Id. at 222-23, 251 N.W. at 487.
41. Id. at 217, 251 N.W. at 485. The court observed:
Because they as directors had that controlling power and responsibility, whatever was
done by subordinate officers, agents, or employees of the corporation, in the usual and
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of liability was the "participation" that results "when there is an
act or omission on [the director's] part which logically leads to
the inference that he has had a share in the wrongful acts of the
corporation which constitute the offense. There must be, at least,
evidence for which acquiescence, if not active aid, may be in-
ferred.""2
As a general rule, however, proof of position in the corporate
structure, standing alone, is not determinative of the issue of partic-
ipation in a proscribed transaction. Courts require that the prosecu-
tion prove some personal involvement by the senior corporate offi-
cial in the offense.43 For example, in McCollum v. State," the vice
president in charge of the corporation's storage depot was convicted
of polluting public waters after a defective or improperly operated
piece of equipment allowed oil to escape into the harbor. The evi-
dence established that the defendant had delegated to subordinates
the responsibility for the operation of the device. Noting the absence
of any testimony showing that the defendant was actually in charge
of the machinery, or that he was in any manner personally con-
nected with the pollution or knowingly permitted it, the court dis-
missed the conviction.45 Thus, although different courts may require
varying degrees of "participation" by the corporate official, all ap-
pear to agree that the mere occupation of an important position in
the corporate hierarchy is insufficient to incur liability.
C. Statutes Explicitly Identifying Culpable Individuals
Although state courts utilize judicially created standards to
ordinary course of its business or affairs, after the directors had knowledge thereof, or
were chargeable with such knowledge, may be deemed to have been done with the
approval or at the direction of the board of directors, either expressly or by necessary
implication by way of acquiescence.
Id at 216-17, 251 N.W. at 485.
42. Id. at 223, 251 N.W. at 488. Without knowledge or opportunity to discover the
conversions, however, the court stated that criminal liability would not lie. Id. at 218, 251
N.W. at 486. Here the defendants were chargeable with knowledge because the questionable
transactions had been discussed at board meetings. Id. at 222, 251 N.W. at 487. But see State
v. Nelson, 83 S.D. 655, 165 N.W.2d 55 (1969) (holding that, on similar facts, the circumstan-
tial evidence of the corporate officer's participation was insufficient absent evidence of his
direct participation in the illegal transactions or mention of them at board meetings).
. 43. In both Burnam, discussed in text accompanying notes 35-36 supra, and Overland
Cotton Mill, discussed in note 37 supra, the courts emphasized that the individual defendants
were responsible for the areas of the organizations in which the offenses occurred.
44. 165 Tex. Crim. 241, 305 S.W.2d 612 (1957).
45. Id. at 243-44, 305 S.W.2d at 613-14. The court was persuaded by defendant's argu-
ment that he would not be liable in a civil action because he had delegated the operation of
the machinery to subordinates. In dictum the court went on to suggest that the corporation
could be prosecuted.
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identify corporate officials liable for a corporation's violation of
criminal laws, some statutory schemes specify the superior officials
who will be held responsible for the crimes of the corporation. For
example, a New York statute provides that criminal liability for the
failure of a corporate employer to pay contributions required by a
labor agreement to a union pension fund will attach to the presi-
dent, secretary, treasurer, or "officers exercising corresponding
functions."46 In People v. Trapp,47 defendant, the president of a
corporation that had failed to make the required payments, argued
that the statute was unconstitutional on its face because it sub-
jected to criminal penalties corporate officers who might have been
unaware of the corporate noncompliance and who also might not
have possessed the requisite authority to effectuate compliance with
the statute. The court held that the statute was a legitimate at-
tempt by the legislature to impose upon officers the responsibility
of insuring corporate compliance with the legislative mandate and
to criminalize a failure to perform that duty. The court neverthe-
46. N.Y. LABOR LAW (McKinney) § 198-c (1977-1978 Cum. Supp.). A violation results
in a misdemeanor.
47. 20 N.Y.2d 613, 233 N.E.2d 110, 286 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1967).
48. Id. at 616, 233 N.E.2d at 112, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See also People v. Mancuso, 255
N.Y. 463, 175 N.E. 177 (1931) (upholding a statute making directors of moneyed corporations
liable for failure to exercise care and diligence in the administration of the corporation).
Failure to perform a legislatively mandated duty running only to the corporation and not
directly to the individual agents presented problems in early cases. In People v. Clark, 8 N.Y.
Crim. 179, 14 N.Y.S. 642 (1891), the court upheld an indictment of the president and directors
of a railroad for their "participation" in a violation of a law forbidding the operation of trains
with open stoves in the cars. Characterizing the alleged offense as an "affirmative act," the
court distinguished early railroad cases holding that statutory duties imposed upon compa-
nies such as railroads to use due care to protect travelers were not duties running directly to
the corporate officers, and therefore, that no individual liability could arise from the corpora-
tion's negligent failure to comply with the requirements of the legislature. See id. at 189-93,
14 N.Y.S. at 650-53. The court observed that "mere neglect to act does not constitute a crime,
except against the class upon whom the duty is imposed." Id. at 195, 14 N.Y.S. at 655. See
Lee, supra note 17, at 25.
The Model Penal Code avoids the dictum in People v. Clark by providing:
Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation . . . any agent of the
corporation . . . having primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is legally
accountable for a reckless omission to perform the required act to the same extent as
if the duty were imposed by law directly upon himself.
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 2.07 (6)(b). See also People v. Strong, 363 Ill. 602, 2
N.E.2d 942 (1936) (a statutory duty to execute and submit reports of collection of sales tax
did not devolve to the individual defendant).
One court has held that the duty violated must be a statutory duty, and not a common-
law fiduciary duty. Although stating that no liability would lie for a violation of an oath to
deal honestly and diligently on behalf of the corporation, the court noted in dictum that, when
a statute forbids a corporation to do an act, the prohibition extends to the board of directors
and each director individually. People v. Knapp, 206 N.Y. 373, 381, 99 N.E. 841, 844 (1912).
It appears, therefore, that a statutory prohibition, but not an affirmative duty to act, imposed
on the corporation may devolve to individual agents.
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less construed the statute to exculpate nominal corporate officials
who were not actually involved in the violation: "We hold that...
an officer may not be convicted of violating the statute unless he
stood in such a relation to the corporate affairs that it may be
presumed that he knew -or should have known of and taken some
steps to prevent the non-payment." 9 Further identification of those
officers who stand in such a relation to the corporation was unneces-
sary in this case because the defendant was the only active officer
and the principal shareholder." As People v. Trapp suggests, state
courts frequently add judicial gloss to statutes to require that some
evidence of individual misconduct exists before individual defen-
dants are convicted.51
III. CULPABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE CORPORATION UNDER
PRESENT FEDERAL LAW
Often relying on state law precedent, the federal judiciary and
statutes also impose liability for participation,12 actual or construc-
tive knowledge, 53 and failure to control corporate misconduct.-4 Like
their state counterparts, federal courts avoid imposing vicarious
49. 20 N.Y.2d at 618, 233 N.E.2d at 113, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
50. Id. See also City of St. Louis v. Boos, 503 S.W.2d 133 (Mo. App. 1973), in which a
city ordinance made it unlawful for any "person" to fail to repair or demolish a building found
by the building commission to be unsafe. "Person" was further defined by the ordinance to
include "officers, agents, or members of a corporation" responsible for the violation. The
court held that a nominal officer who never went to board meetings or performed any func-
tions could not be liable absent a showing of knowledge or participation. Id. at 135.
51. See, e.g., State v. Monteleone, 63 N.J. Super. 596, 165 A.2d 39 (1960), off'd, 36 N.J.
93, 175 A.2d 207 (1961). The individual defendants argued that a statute holding agents of a
corporation liable for the payment of fines for a business' violation of a Sunday closing law
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court disagreed, emphasizing that the statute
did not impose vicarious liability; rather, the court construed the statute to apply only when
the individuals as well as the corporation were charged and convicted of violating the closing
law.
An interesting problem dealing with statutory presumptions arose in People v. Lieber,
146 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 910, 304 P.2d 869 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1956). During an inspection
of a pharmacy a state narcotics agent discovered that the number of vials of a certain drug
actually in supply was less than the number that the records showed should have been on
hand. The president of the company was charged with dispensing drugs without making a
proper record, and the prosecution attempted to apply a statute that provided for prima facie
guilt if a defendant had in his possession a lesser amount of narcotics than the amount
accounted for in his records. The court held that although the presumption might properly
apply to one who in his individual capacity possesses narcotics, the presumption was
"unreasonable and indeed unconstitutional" when applied to a corporate officer or employee
without further proof that such defendant had access to the drugs, or that the shortage was
"occasioned by some act" of the defendant. Id. at 914, 304 P.2d at 872.
52. See text accompanying note 28 supra and notes 85-92 infra.
53. See text accompanying notes 30, 37-41 supra and notes 80-82 infra.
54. See text accompanying note 33 supra and notes 63-84 infra.
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liability on corporate officials by articulating standards of culpabil-
ity that require either defendant's personal misconduct or the pres-
ence of illegal corporate activity that defendant is charged by law
to prevent. Many of the factors and standards of culpability dis-
cussed in the state decisions also have appeared in federal decisions.
For example, corporate agents in federal courts have no more suc-
cess than do defendants in state courts in urging that criminal stat-
utes invoked against them as individuals do not reach conduct that
they engage in for the corporation in a representative capacity.5
Federal courts similarly reject the use of corporate entities as crimi-
nal "alter egos" by proprietors seeking to avoid identification under
the criminal statutes.56
Many federal statutes contain provisions specifically identify-
ing those agents who are liable for the corporation's crimes. 7 For
example, section 14 of the Clayton Act 58 provides that whenever a
corporation violates any of the penal provisions of the antitrust
laws, "such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the individ-
ual directors, officers, or agents of such corporation who shall have
authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole
or in part such violation." Thus, the statute describes those individ-
uals who are liable as well as the conduct producing liability.5
55. See text accompanying note 21 supra. In United States v. Bach, 151 F.2d 177 (7th
Cir. 1945), the agent who knowingly and intentionally sold whiskey at a price in excess of
the ceiling established by federal regulations was convicted despite payment of the money
directly to the corporation and despite the defendant's acting in a representative capacity at
the time of the sale.
56. See, e.g., United States v. H. Wool & Sons, Inc., 215 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1954). The
corporation and its principal owner were convicted of violations of federal food and drug laws.
The corporation was a family-owned enterprise, and the dividing line between the "company"
and the individual defendant was "shadowy." The court found that defendant was active in
the corporation's management and was the "dominating factor" behind its transactions. Id.
at 99.
57. Such statutes appear both within and outside Title 18. For an exhaustive list of
these statutes, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, I WORKING
PAPERS 176 n.39, 209-13 (Appendix B) (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPERS].
58. 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
59. Apparently, § 14 does not displace the provisions of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1976), holding "every person" guilty who makes a contract or engages in a
combination in restraint of trade. Thus, § 14 does not describe the universe of possible
defendants. See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1962), discussed at note 129
infra.
18 U.S.C. § 1115 (1976) provides for fine and imprisonment for a shipowner whose neglect
or misconduct results in the death of any person. The statute further provides that when such
owner is a corporation, "any executive officer of such corporation, for the time being actually
charged with the control and management of the operation, equipment, or navigation of such
. . . vessel, who has knowingly and willfully caused or allowed. . . neglect" shall be liable.
Thus, the statute identifies both the individual defendant and the required culpability. The
Proposed Code contains similar provisions in specific areas. For example, when a political
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Criminal statutes, however, often provide sanctions against "any
person"60 violating the law, without further reference to the identifi-
cation of the culpable individual actor. Problems arise when the
most identifiable "person" violating the statute is a corporation, or
when only subordinate employees engage in the proscribed conduct,
but prosecution of superior officials causing or allowing the conduct
is clearly appropriate." Primarily in the area of public welfare offen-
ses, 2 the federal judiciary attempts to describe the officials within
the corporate hierarchy who should bear the criminal responsibility
for the criminal acts of the corporation.
A. Dotterweich Liability
The preeminent United States Supreme Court case addressing
the proper identification of corporate officials liable for corporate
crimes, United States v. Dotterweich,3 arose over two interstate
shipments of drugs by the Buffalo Pharmacal Company. 4 Both
shipments, which were prepared by the company's employees in
response to an order received by the company from a physician,
required the repackaging of drugs that the company had received
from the wholesale manufacturer. Dotterweich, the president and
general manager of the company, had no personal connection with
either shipment, but as the officer in charge of the company's busi-
ness, he had given general instructions to fill orders received from
physicians. Charging that the shipments contained misbranded and
adulterated drugs, the government prosecuted both the company
and Dotterweich for violating the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (Food and Drug Act). 5 The jury convicted Dotterweich, but
candidate violates campaign expense limitations, any officer or member of the candidate's
political committee who "consents" to the expenditure is guilty of an offense. See Proposed
Code, supra note 1, § 1518(a)(2).
60. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides that use of the word "person" in any statute includes
corporations unless the context indicates otherwise. Section 111 of the Proposed Code contin-
ues this rule of statutory construction.
61. Many of the cases discussed in this Note present criminal situations in which the
diffusion of responsibility and action created by corporate bureaucracy makes it difficult to
identify a single agent or group of agents who actually commit the criminal act. Cases under
discussion also present those situations in which prosecution of high-level officials instead of
the subordinate employees who actually perform the conduct is the more prudent prosecu-
torial tactic. See notes 8 & 10 supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 31 supra.
63. 320 U.S. 277, rehearing denied, 320 U.S. 815 (1943), rev'g United States v. Buffalo
Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1942).
64. The statement of facts is taken from the appellate court's opinion. See United
States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501-02 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd sub noam. United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
65. Food and Drug Act § 301(a), 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1976).
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"[f]or some unexplainable reason," 6 acquitted the company.
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the defendant argued that the
statute provided punishment only for the corporation and not for an
innocent agent who, ignorant of the misbranding or adulteration,
takes part in an interstate shipment of food or drugs.67 Although
recognizing that the Food and Drug Act defined "person" to include
an individual as well as a corporation, and that the Act imposed
liability on "any person" who caused the introduction of illegal
drugs into commerce, the court nevertheless refused to construe the
statute literally to include all persons having any part in causing the
shipment, such as the clerk who performs the packaging.8 The court
held that the criminal provision included only the "drug dealer,
whether corporation or individual" and reversed Dotterweich's con-
viction for lack of evidence showing that he was the "principal" who
operated the corporation as a criminal "alter ego."'"
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed
the conviction, holding that all persons having a "responsible share
in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws"
violate the Act.70 Finding no congressional intent to punish the cor-
poration while exculpating individuals within the corporate hier-
archy,7' the Court emphasized that the statute was enacted as a
66. 131 F.2d at 501.
67. Id. at 502. The appellate court, having found that there was sufficient evidence to
support the charge that the drugs were misbranded and adulterated, rejected Dotterweich's
argument that the jury's failure to convict the corporation was so inconsistent with the finding
of his guilt that the verdict must be reversed: "We think the usual principle is applicable
that error cannot be asserted for inconsistency in the jury's verdict." Id. at 502.
68. Id. at 503. "[W~e can find no basis in the statutory language for drawing a distinc-
tion between agents of high or low rank." Id. In support of its limited construction, the court
pointed to the "guaranty" clause of the Food and Drug Act, which provided immunity from
prosecution for any retailer who had received a guaranty from the wholesaler that the drugs
were not adulterated or misbranded. Food and Drug Act § 303(c), 21 U.S.C. § 333(c) (1976).
Reasoning that any such guaranty would go to the principal in the transaction, such as the
company itself, the court concluded that Congress could not have contemplated criminal guilt
for all employees in the company, such as shipping clerks. 131 F.2d at 503.
69. Id. at 503. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. A dissenting opinion, rejecting
the majority's fears that prosecutions of insignificant agents rather than their bosses would
result from a literal reading of the statute, would have read the statute to "render liable all
persons who take part in causing" the shipment. 131 F.2d at 503 (Swan, J., dissenting).
70. 320 U.S. at 284. The Court agreed with the appellate court's rejection of Dotter-
weich's argument concerning the inconsistency of the exoneration of the company with his
individual conviction. Id. at 279. See note 67 supra. The Court rejected the appellate court's
reliance on the "guaranty clause" for support for a narrow reading of individual liability
under the Act. 320 U.S. at 280, 283-84. See note 68 supra.
71. The Court reasoned that if Dotterweich were not subject to penalties under the Act,
it must be because individuals were immune from prosecution when the "person" violating
the Act was a corporation. The Court found that such a reading of the statute would defeat
the legislative design "to enlarge and stiffen the penal net" of defendants. 320 U.S. at 281-
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regulatory measure to protect public health and welfare, and that
by dispensing with the conventional requirement of awareness of
some wrongdoing, the statute "puts the burden of acting at hazard
upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible rela-
tion to a public danger. 7 2 The Court concluded that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to decide that Dotterweich had suffi-
cient responsibility for the shipment. The Court failed, however, to
identify the evidence it thought decisive, nor did it offer any guide-
lines for identifying the individuals in a business organization who
stand in such a "responsible relation" to the offense or who have the
necessary "responsible share" in the commission of the offense to
incur liability. Instead, the Court left that determination to the
"good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the
ultimate judgment of juries."73 Although the majority did not dis-
pute the appellate court's finding that Dotterweich had no personal
connection with the illegal shipments, it further supported its rein-
statement of the conviction by citing the traditional criminal con-
cept that all persons "responsible for" a misdemeanor, or who "aid
and abet" in a misdemeanor, are guilty of the offense. 4
A vigorous dissent pointed to the lack of any "personal guilt"
or. active participation by Dotterweich in the offensive shipment and
concluded that the majority had imputed guilt to Dotterweich solely
because of his position as president and general manager of the
company. Finding no legislative intent to impose vicarious liability,
the dissent maintained that policy arguments leading to the imposi-
tion of strict liability in matters of public health and welfare should
not be used to eliminate the requirement that the legislature specify
"with reasonable certainty" the individuals liable under the Act.75
Despite language in the majority opinion indicating that the
prosecution should prove some degree of action or wrongful nonac-
tion by the corporate executive," many lower court decisions apply-
82. In view of the fact that noncorporate proprietors who could violate the Act were relatively
small in number, the Court rejected the argument that Congress intended to create individual
liability only when the corporation was merely the individual's "alter ego," as the appellate
court had held. Id. at 282-83. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
72. 320 U.S. at 280-81.
73. Id. at 285.
74. Id. at 281, 284. See notes 28 supra and 76 infra.
75. 320 U.S. at 286-88. Dotterweich was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Murphy writing
for the dissent. Some commentators agree with Justice Murphy's suggestion that the majority
opinion confused strict liability and vicarious liability. See LAFAvE & Sco'rr, supra note 5, §
32, at 226; Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107, 116-18.
76. The Court had relied partially on the theory of aiding and abetting: "To speak with
technical accuracy, under § 301 [of the Act] a corporation may commit an offense and all
persons who aid and abet its commission are equally guilty." 320 U.S. at 284. Aiding and
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ing the Dotterweich standard of liability to senior officials for offen-
ses committed by subordinates 7 have not required evidence of par-
ticipation in the offensive transaction 8 or of the accused's presence
at the time the proscribed activity took place.79 For example, in
Carolene Products Co. v. United States,"0 the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the conviction of a corporation, its president, and its vice
president for interstate shipment of adulterated milk despite the
protestations of the individual defendants that they had no personal
part in the eight specific illegal shipments alleged in the indictment.
The court charged the defendants with "knowledge" of the ship-
ments," citing numerous cases holding directing heads of a corpora-
tion liable without evidence of personal supervision of the illegal
corporate activity. 2 The language in cases such as Carolene
Products seems to support the Dotterweich dissent's assertion that
the Court had introduced a statutorily unauthorized species of vi-
carious liability holding the executive officers of a corporation liable
for crimes committed by employees merely because of the officer's
position within the corporation.8 Dotterweich and its progeny, how-
abetting usually encompasses some type of wrongful conduct, such as direct participation or
acquiescence. See notes 28-30 & 42 supra and accompanying text. In addition, the Court's
use of the phrase "responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction" indicates some
action or wrongful inaction by defendant. 320 U.S. at 284.
77. Most cases involve the prosecution of owners, presidents, and managers for strict
liability offenses when subordinate employees consummate the actual commission of the
offense, such as the shipping of illegal drugs. But see United States v. Siler Drug Store Co.,
376 F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), in which the government prosecuted the company,
its president, and a store clerk.
78. See United States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335, 337 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1948); Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61,
66, aff'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
79. United States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335, 337 (6th Cir. 1974); Golden Grain Macaroni
Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 166, 168 (9th Cir. 1953).
80. 140 F.2d 61 (4th Cir.), aff'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 18 (1944).
81. Id. at 66. In strict liability offenses, such as violations of the Food and Drug Act,
awareness of wrongdoing is not required. But see United States v. Abbott Laboratories, 505
F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975) (indicating that knowledge of an
impurity in the drugs shipped is necessary). The only "knowledge" required under the Food
and Drug Act is knowledge by defendant that his subordinates cause drugs to be introduced
into interstate commerce in the regular course of business. See United States v. Parfait
Powder Puff Co., 163 F.2d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948). The
reliance of the court in Carotene Products on the defendant's "knowledge" resembles the use
of constructive knowledge as a form of "participation" in state cases imposing individual
liability. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
82. 140 F.2d at 66. The court cited Dotterweich, Detroit White Lead Works (discussed
at note 32 supra), Gilbert (discussed in text accompanying notes 38-42 supra), and Burnam
(discussed in text accompanying note 35 supra). The trial court, though apparently not the
appellate court, had relied on the "aiding and abetting" language in Dotterweich. See text
accompanying note 74 supra.
83. See text accompanying note 75 supra. See also WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at
184 n.61.
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ever, were based on statutes reflecting a congressional concern for
the results of corporate activity, and not any particular acts of mis-
conduct by employees leading to the violation. The liability of sen-
ior officials, therefore, is not classically "vicarious" because culpa-
bility does not derive from the commission of the offense by a partic-
ular employee; a result rather than an act is the basis of liability.,
Although the issue in Dotterweich was the proper statutory
construction of "person" in the Food and Drug Act, courts generally
recognize the Dotterweich standard for liability-a "responsible
share in the furtherance of the transactions"-as controlling case
law on the limits of individual liability for corporate offenses under
other statutes, unless the statute expressly provides otherwise. In
cases not applying the Food and Drug Act or in cases dealing with
mens rea offenses, federal courts appear to require some affirmative
act, direction, participation, authorization, or at least acquiescence
in the offense before imposing individual liability for corporate
crimes. 5 For example, in Nye & Nissen v. United States,81 the
Supreme Court relied on the aiding and abetting language of
Dotterweich7 to hold that conviction of the president of a company
charged with knowingly filing false invoices for payment with the
government required that defendant be shown to have associated
himself with the venture or to have participated in the illegal
scheme." The circumstantial evidence approved by the Court to
support aiding and abetting resembled the indicia of "responsible
share" or "responsible relation" that federal courts developed in the
area of public welfare offenses after Dotterweich.89 This develop-
ment suggests that courts assessing the individual liability of corpo-
rate officials might properly focus on the nature of the officials'
84. See id. at 186 n.69, 188. The concept of vicarious liability usually attributes the acts
of an employee directly to his employer. See note 16 supra. See generally LAFAvE & Scorr,
supra note 5, § 32.
85. See, e.g., United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(prosecution of the president of a corporation for violation of obscenity laws); United States
v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 202 F. Supp. 639, 644 (D.D.C. 1962) (prosecution of corporate
officer in an antitrust case). The Senate Judiciary Committee has asserted that active partici-
pation should be a prerequisite for individual liability for a non-strict liability offense under
present federal case law. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST SEass., REPORT
ON THE CRIMINAL JusTicE REFORM Ac'f OF 1975, 74 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as
COMMrrrEE PRINT].
86. 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
87. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
88. 336 U.S. at 618-19.
89. Defendant was the manager of a family-owned business, and was in charge of the
office where the fraudulent invoices were executed. Id. at 614; see text accompanying note
95 infra. The language of the Court resembles that of state cases dealing with the use of the
corporate form to mask individual liability. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
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position and responsibilities rather than on their conduct. In United
States v. Wise," however, the Court indicated that the prosecution
must establish something more than the relationship between the
corporation and the individual defendant. The Wise Court cited
Dotterweich as authority to construe "person[s]" subject to penal-
ties under the Sherman Act to include "all officers who have a
responsible share in the proscribed transaction."91 In clarifying
"responsible share," the Court apparently restricted liability to
those officers who actively promote the illegal scheme and who par-
ticipate in effecting the illegal transactions by authorizing, ordering,
or helping to perpetuate the crime. 2
The majority of cases in the federal circuit courts of appeals
dealing with Dotterweich liability appear to apply a standard of
culpability that falls between the Carolene Products emphasis on
liability of corporate managers for illegal results and the Wise em-
phasis on actual participation in the illegal conduct. An excellent
exposition of the proof required to establish a "reponsible share" in
the corporation's crime appears in United States v. Ktehman,93 in
which the president of a chemicals corporation was charged with
violation of a statute penalizing "any person" who ships or causes
to be shipped in interstate commerce any misbranded or banned
hazardous substances. 4 The court pointed to evidence showing that,
during the period the shipments were made, defendant exercised
close control of all details of the corporate activity: he was president
and owner of all stock, and was one of only two directors the corpora-
tion had ever had; the corporation had only a handful of employees
at the time of the shipments; the defendant hired all employees; he
had actual control of the company and gave all operating instruc-
tions; he formulated company policy and personally supervised the
advertising used to promote a water repellant that did not carry the
required precautionary instructions and warning. The Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that the evidence showing that he "formulates, di-
rects and controls the acts and practices of the corporation" was
sufficient to support a conviction. 5
90. 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
91. Id. at 409; see note 59 supra.
92. 370 U.S. at 416. See also WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at 179-80.
93. 397 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1968).
94. Federal Hazardous Substances Act §§ 4(a), 5(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1263(a), 1264(a)
(1976). The corporation was also charged and convicted.
95. 397 F.2d at 408. The conviction of the president, nevertheless, was invalid because
he had gained immunity from prosecution by testifying before the Federal Trade Commission
under a subpoena, rendering his testimony unusable against him. Id. at 409. Of course, the
indicia of control and direction of the company's affairs will vary according to the corpora-
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Indicia of actual control and direction of corporate activity,
therefore, constitute the basis of individual culpability of corporate
officials under the Dotterweich standard. The authority of execu-
tive officials to devise measures necessary to insure corporate com-
pliance with regulatory statutes and their failure to implement ade-
quate safeguards are further grounds for establishing a "responsible
share" in corporate violations of the law.97
B. Dotterweich Liability Revisited - United States v. Park
The Supreme Court most recently reviewed Dotterweich liabil-
ity in United States v. Park,9 another case arising from the Food
and Drug Act. The defendant corporation, unlike the small enter-
prise in Dotterweich,99 was a national retail food chain with 36,000
employees, 874 retail outlets, and sixteen warehouses. The charges
against the corporation and codefendant Park, the president and
chief executive officer of the corporation, stemmed from inspections
at the corporation's Baltimore warehouse, which was found to be
accessible to rodents. Evidence produced at trial included testi-
mony that, according to the bylaws of the corporation, the president
had "general and active supervision of the affairs, business, officers
and employees of the company," 1" but that Park had delegated
normal operating duties, including the maintenance of sanitation.
The testimony also established that both Park and the corporation's
division vice president in Baltimore had received letters from the
tion's size and complexity. For an example of Dotterweich liability applied in a larger corpo-
rate structure, see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975), discussed in text accompanying
notes 98-112 infra.
96. See, e.g., Hamilton v. United States, 219 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1955) (mere ownership
of 51% of a drugstore, without proof of control of its management, is insufficient to incur
liability for the company's violation of the law). See also United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d
600 (7th Cir. 1948) (prosecution under the Food and Drug Act, in which the court approved
a jury instruction charging that the determination of a sufficient "responsible share" must
take into consideration the work performed by defendant, his duties and responsibilities, and
the extent to which he controlled and directed the conduct of the business).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Shapiro, 491 F.2d 335, 337 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
98. 421 U.S. 658 (1975). For a thorough discussion of the facts adduced at trial in Park,
see Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091,
1116-20 (1976).
99. The Supreme Court gave little information about the corporate setting in
Dotterweich. A later case in the Fourth Circuit reviewed the Dotterweich trial transcript and
reported that the company prosecuted in that case was small, and that all the employees
worked on one floor of the building. Dotterweich was the direct supervisor of all employees.
He made every executive decision and had direct supervisory responsibility over the physical
acts of all employees. United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 658
(1975).
100. 421 U.S. at 663 n.7. Park was assigned to the corporate headquarters in Philadel-
phia. Id. at 660.
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Food and Drug Administration concerning past infractions. Al-
though Park contended that he had properly assigned certain func-
tions to dependable subordinates, he nevertheless conceded that he
was responsible for the entire operation of the corporation. Relying
on Dotterweich, the trial judge rejected Park's motion for a directed
acquittal, which asserted that no evidence showed that he was per-
sonally connected with the violations. The judge's charge instructed
the jury that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Park
had a "responsible relation to the situation, even though he may not
have participated personally." ' The jury returned a guilty verdict,
but the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the jury
instruction did not mention the requirement that some type of
"wrongful action" in the form of an act of commission or omission
is an essential element of every crime. 1 2 According to the appellate
court, the defendant's position in the company was not a sufficient
basis for imposing liability: "It is the defendant's relation to the
criminal acts, not merely his relation to the corporation, which the
jury must consider." ' 3
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and re-
jected the appellate court's requirement that the jury be instructed
that the government must establish "wrongful action,"104 the Court
was careful to point out that liability did not rest solely on the
defendant's position in the corporation. The Court characterized
Dotterweich liability as the criminal accountability of persons who
have failed to exercise the authority and supervisory responsibility
reposed in them by the business organization and have thus com-
mitted a violation.0 5 Apparently not relying on Park's prior notice
that the Baltimore warehouse was substandard, the Court noted
that the Food and Drug Act "imposes not only a positive duty to
seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and pri-
marily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that viola-
tions will not occur." 1 6 In this case, the Court found the prosecu-
101. Id. at 665 n.9.
102. 499 F.2d at 841-42.
103. Id. at 841. The court relied on the aiding and abetting language of Dotterweich,
concluding that there must be proof that Park participated either "directly or constructively"
in the criminal acts. Id.
104. 421 U.S. at 673.
105. Id. at 671.
106. Id. at 672. In its exposition of the facts, the Court revealed that the Food and Drug
Administration had informed Park by letter of insanitary conditions at the corporation's
Philadelphia and Baltimore warehouses. Id. at 661-62, 664-65. The Court, however, did not
seem to rely on Park's actual notice of violations of the law within the corporation. Instead,
the Court articulated the basis of liability as the failure to seek out and remedy violations
and to implement measures to insure that violations did not occur. Id. at 672. The prosecutor
[Vol. 31:965'986
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tion's evidence and the judge's instructions sufficient to allow thejury properly to determine that the defendant's culpability rested
not only on his position in the corporate hierarchy, but also on his
responsibility to prevent the conditions giving rise to the viola-
tions.1'0 The Court noted, however, that the duty imposed by Con-
gress on responsible corporate agents to seek out and remedy poten-
tial and existing violations does not impose absolute liability on
corporate officials for all violations within the corporation. Because
the defendant is being held accountable for "causing" a violation of
the law, he must be allowed to raise the defense that he was power-
less to correct or to prevent the violation. Absent this rebuttal evi-
dence, however, the failure of the defendant to fulfill a duty
"imposed by the interaction of the corporate agent's authority and
the statute furnishes a sufficient causal link."108
Although the Court expressly rejected the requirement of
"wrongful action" for criminal accountability, Park's explanation of
the basis of culpability of corporate officials not directly involved in
the corporate offense resembles the approach taken by previous
state and federal decisions.'0 ' This approach perceives a legal duty
placed upon corporate managers to prevent corporate violations and
a resulting criminal liability for failure to do so. Park appears, how-
ever, to narrow Dotterweich in at least two respects. First, Park
emphasizes that liability attaches because of the defendant's rela-
tionship to the violation itself, and not merely because of his rela-
tionship to the corporation.110 This required nexus seems to limit the
expansiveness of cases such as Carolene Products and to necessitate
some showing of responsibility for that segment of the corporate
at trial had emphasized that Park was responsible for changing the sanitation systems which
he knew had been maintained insufficiently by his delegates. Id. at 675 n.16. The Court
mentioned Park's notice of substandard conditions in discussing his defense of delegation of
authority to the Baltimore personnel. See note 252 infra. Of course, because of its strict
liability nature, the Food and Drug Act does not require that the defendant have notice or
knowledge of unsanitary conditions. It is hard to believe, however, that Park's failure to
correct his corporation's procedures after notice of continuing violations was not an important
factor in the prosecutorial decision to proceed against Park and in the Court's subsequent
opinion. See Note, supra note 98, at 1116-17.
107. 421 U.S. at 675.
108. Id. at 674.
109. See text accompanying notes 33-36, 97 supra.
110. In Dotterweich the Court explained that liability accompanied a "responsible
share" in the business as well as a "responsible share" in the illegal transaction itself, or a
"responsible relation" to the public danger that the statute seeks to control. 320 U.S. at 281,
284. Although Dotterweich itself is ambiguous about the need to connect the defendant with
the violation, many cases have concentrated solely on the relationship of the defendant to
the corporation, with little inquiry into the defendant's responsibility for the part of the
enterprise in which the violation occurred. See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
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activity in which the violation of the law occurs."' Second, Park
suggests that Dotterweich "responsible share" liability may have
been restricted to strict liability statutes, such as the Food and Drug
Act, which impose a "duty" to protect public health and welfare."'
Thus, without further statutory guidance, the continued vitality of
the Dotterweich approach to identify the proper individual defen-
dants responsible for corporate crime remains unclear.
IV. SECTION 403 OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE
Although the primary aim of the Proposed Code is to revise and
consolidate all federal felony provisions into a single title of the
United States Code," 3 the Senate Judiciary Committee admits that
some criminal law reform has been undertaken in addition to the
recodification of existing statutes."4 The need for reform in the area
of individual liability for corporate criminality became evident dur-
ing the deliberations of the National Commission on Reform of Fed-
eral Criminal Laws,"' 5 which grappled with the difficulties of defin-
ing the culpability of individuals for organizational misconduct
while preparing the early draft of the Proposed Code. The Commis-
sion stated the objectives of a general statute describing individual
responsibility as: (1) deterring individual misconduct, and (2)
coercing affirmative action by corporate agents to prevent harmful
corporate activity."' Furtherance of these objectives requires a stat-
ute addressed not only to the actors who engage in the conduct but
also to the officials who have control over or influence upon the
actors' conduct. The National Commission faced the challenge of
111. The Park Court was careful to point out that, as general manager of the corpora-
tion, the defendant was specifically responsible for the sanitation of the warehouses. See 421
U.S. at 663. See also text accompanying notes 250-52 infra for a discussion of the "delegation"
defense.
In United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1976), the appellate court approved the
trial judge's ruling that criminal responsibility of a corporate official requires a consideration
of the defendant's relationship to the violation as well as his relationship to the corporation.
Id. at 514.
112. This is the opinion of the Senate Judiciary Committee. See CoMurrrEa PRINT,
supra note 85, at 74 n.88.
113. Title I of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Proposed Code) will replace the present Title 18 and will include all felonies chargeable
under federal law. Offenses described elsewhere and not amended by Title H of S. 1437 or
other amending acts may be retained as misdemeanors.
114. CoMmTTEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 7. The Proposed Code has been criticized for
attempting changes in substantive law. See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. Ell, subpt. B, at
1649.
115. The so-called Brown Commission prepared the original draft of the Proposed Code.
See note 1 supra.
116. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at 181-82.
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recommending provisions that locate and properly decide the level
of corporate management at which high-ranking officials should be
liable."' The Commission discussed the need to impose liability on
officials for neglect of their general duties of supervision and man-
agement, although such liability was a departure from the more
traditional concepts of culpability as an actor or accomplice. One
possible avenue to reach managers and supervisors was to impose
vicarious liability on management for the misconduct of subordi-
nate employees."' A second approach would have "pin[ned] their
[criminal] responsibility upon their own fault" by providing liabil-
ity for offenses that management could have prevented had they
properly managed and supervised."' A third suggestion was to im-
pose a duty on all corporate officials to prevent all types of criminal
conduct occurring on behalf of the corporation.'20 The present sec-
tions of the Proposed Code dealing with individual liability, which
are substantially similar to their predecessors in the Commission's
draft,"' indicate a rejection of vicarious liability in favor of criminal
responsibility based on a failure of managers and supervisors to
adequately perform their corporate duties.
During the legislative hearings on the Proposed Code, repre-
sentatives of both the bar and business questioned the wisdom of a
general statute on individual liability. Some witnesses believed that
case law should determine corporate and individual liability, or that
specific statutory provisions should control areas, such as antitrust,
in which Congress has seen a special need to identify culpable indi-
viduals."' Because the general provisions for liability will apply to
such diverse areas as tax, labor relations, securities, civil and con-
sumer rights, and environmental protection, opponents preferred a
statute-by-statute approach that would allow Congress to define
corporate and individual liability "in a manner consistent with the
nature and severity of the offense and the goals to be achieved" by
penal sanctions.12 Proponents of a general statute argued that the
117. Id. at 182-83.
118. Id. at 186; see note 16 supra.
119. Id. The National Commission stated that no such liability existed under present
federal law. Such liability, however, has precedents in both state and federal cases. See text
accompanying notes 31-36, 106 supra.
120. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at 187.
121. Compare Proposed Code, supra note 1, § 403 with FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, §
403.
122. See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. XI, at 7677; Subcommittee Hearings, pt. HI,
subpt. B, at 1649 (statement of Charles S. Maddock). See also text accompanying notes 57-
59 supra.
123. See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. II, subpt. B, at 1780-81 (statement of the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers).
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extent and severity of corporate crime dispensed with the need for
any further congressional determination that the criminal law deal-
ing with individual liability needed to be strengthened.' 24 The pre-
vailing view thought it desirable to give some statutory structure to
the entire area to guide the courts and the individuals potentially
subject to liability.rs
Section 403, the product of the deliberations of the draftsmen
of the Proposed Code, states three general principles of individual
liability for crime in the corporate setting.'26 Section 403 applies
when a corporation commits an offense'2 defined elsewhere in the
Proposed Code or in any other statute'2 and the statute or Code
provision defining the offense does not specify the individuals
124. See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. XI, at 7864-66, 7899-939 (statement of Ralph
Nader).
125. Subcommittee Hearings, pt. XI, at 7677 (statement of Senator Roman L. Hruska).
126. Section 403 is part of Chapter Four of the Proposed Code, entitled "Complicity,"
which is intended to "establish the general principles whereby an individual or organization
can be held criminally liable for the conduct of another." CoMmrrrE_ PRinT, supra note 85,
at 63. Section 402 deals with the criminal liability of the corporation and is discussed at note
6 supra. Section 404 details general provisions for Chapter Four and is discussed at note 28
supra and text accompanying notes 224-25 infra. Section 401 covers liability as an accomplice
or conspirator and is discussed at text accompanying notes 227-30 infra. Many state and
federal cases suggest accomplice liability as the basis for holding individuals liable for corpo-
rate criminal conduct. See text accompanying notes 28 & 74 supra. With the more specific
provisions of § 403 available, however, it would be inappropriate for federal courts in the
future to resort to § 401 to explain the liability of individuals within the corporate hierarchy.
As the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed out, each provision of Chapter Four has been
drafted with particular precision to deal with the "special and difficult problems of criminal
responsibility in an organizational setting." CoMMrrr E PInUr, supra note 85, at 63.
127. Because Chapter Four generally defines liability of an individual for the conduct
of another, see note 126 supra, § 403 contemplates the existence of an offense by the corpora-
tion as provided by the principles of § 402. See note 6 supra. Except for prosecutions under §
403(a), see note 132 infra, the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the exist-
ence of the underlying corporate offense for which it seeks to hold the individual defendant
liable. Section 404(b)(2), however, specifically provides that the corporation need not be
convicted or even charged. In addition, § 404(b)(1) provides that the individual defendant
need not "belong to the category of persons who by definition are the only persons capable of
committing the offense directly." Thus, if a statute specifically affixed liability only on the
corporation, the prosecution arguably could rely on § 404(b)(1) to implicate individual defen-
dants as well. See discussion of State v. Fraser, 105 Or. 589, 209 P. 467 (1922), at note 28
supra. Use of this provision, however, would be inappropriate because § 404(b)(1) is intended
to complement § 401, which deals with accomplice liability. See CoMMrrraa PmNT, supra note
85, at 68. As note 126 supra pointed out, § 401 should not apply to the situations contemplated
by this Note, and a statute that prohibits conduct by a "corporation" rather than a "person"
(which would include a corporation) suggests a congressional decision to punish the corpora-
tion instead of individual agents. Compare United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)
("person" includes corporation and individuals) with Sherman v. United States, 282 U.S. 25
(1930) ("common carrier" does not include individuals).
128. Section 103 of the Proposed Code makes the provisions of § 403 applicable to
prosecutions under "any Act of Congress," except as otherwise provided. Thus § 403 may be
utilized in misdemeanor prosecutions outside Title 18. See notes 113 supra and 129 infra.
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within the organization who should bear the criminal responsibil-
ity. 129
A. Section 403(a)-Conduct on Behalf of an Organization
Section 403(a) of the Proposed Code provides:
A person is criminally liable for an offense based upon conduct that he engages
in or causes in the name of an organization or on behalf of an organization to
the same extent as if he engaged in or caused the conduct in his own name or
on his own behalf.
Section 403(a) codifies case law established in both state30 and
federal 3 ' courts in rejecting the defense of acting in a
"representative capacity." The Senate Judiciary Committee stated
that section 403(a) "merely set[s] forth the basic rule that a person
129. Section 103 of the Proposed Code makes the principles of § 403 applicable to all
federal prosecutions "[e]xcept as otherwise provided." Apparently, a statute that indepen-
dently identifies the culpable individuals supersedes § 403. See notes 57-59 supra and accom-
panying text. See also § 403(b) of the Proposed Code, supra note 1, which contains a similar
excepting proviso.
In United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962), discussed in text accompanying notes 90-
92 supra, the Court held that a provision of the antitrust laws specifying that officers of a
corporation participating in or authorizing violations of the law were culpable in addition to
the corporation did not restrict the prosecution of any person responsible under a Dotterweich
analysis. 370 U.S. at 412-15. In Wise the government charged the individual defendants under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), which holds liable "every person" engaging in
a restraint of trade. In 1955 Congress had added § 14 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1976),
which provides that when the "person" referred to in § 1 is a corporation, the violation "shall
be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, officers, or agents of such corporation
who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in whole or in part
such violation." The defendants argued that § 14 of the Clayton Act applies to individuals
acting in a "representative capacity," but that § 1 of the Sherman Act applies only to officers
acting on their own behalf. The Court, studying the legislative history of § 14, concluded that
Congress had intended no such distinction and held that § 14 was merely a "reaffirmation"
of the judicial construction of § 1 that allowed prosecution of all participating officers. 370
U.S. at 412-15. Wise, however, should not be read to indicate that the general principles of §
403 are available despite provisions in a particular statutory scheme identifying the properly
indictable individuals. Because § 403 will hereafter codify general principles of individual
accountability, Congress need not address the issue unless it desires a broader or narrower
scope of prosecution. In any event, courts should heed the comments of the Senate Judiciary
Committee accompanying § 103 of the Proposed Code: "The title is not. . . co-extensive with
the need for congressional enactment of criminal laws, and the Committee recognizes that
application of the provisions in this title to certain places or in certain contexts would be
inappropriate as compared with existing sets of laws governing such areas or contexts."
CoMMrrrEz PRINT, supra note 85, at 21. Although the Committee was specifically referring to
areas of separate legislation dealing with the District of Columbia, the Canal Zone, and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Committee recognizes the need to legislate in more
detail in certain areas, and thus would allay the criticism of opponents of the provision that
it handcuffs more specific congressional treatment of business crimes. See text accompanying
notes 122-23 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 21-27 supra.
131. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
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may not escape liability because his actions were not for himself but
for an organization.' '3 2 The most obvious application of section
403(a) is to cases in which the easily identifiable criminal actor is
the corporate official against whom prosecution is sought.rs Section
403(a) also will apply to an individual engaging in illegal conduct
while attempting to utilize a corporate form to mask his personal
liability, 34 or in situations when the defendant may not be the
clearly identifiable criminal actor, but he nevertheless "caused" the
conduct. 35 An example of the latter situation appears in a recent
state case employing a penal provision similar to section 403(a). 36
In People v. Dean 37 a corporation and its principal officer 31 were
convicted of issuing a corporate check backed by insufficient funds.
Because another corporate agent had signed the check, the defen-
dant claimed that he could not be found guilty because he was
neither the drawer nor the representative drawer. The court held
that, although the defendant had not personally signed and issued
the check, he had "caused" the corporation to issue the check. The
court noted that the defendant was the only active principal in the
business and controlled the course of corporate conduct leading to
the overdraft. 3 ' As People v. Dean indicates, section 403(a) codifies
132. CoMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 75. Because the purpose of § 403(a) is to
remove a defense rather than to establish liability for the offense of the corporation, the
prosecution may not be required to establish the existence of a corporate crime for which it
seeks to hold the individual liable. The defendant's conduct may directly contravene the
statute. See note 127 supra.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Bach, 151 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1945), discussed at note 55
supra.
134. See the "alter ego" cases in text accompanying notes 22-24, 56 supra.
135. The problem of "causation" in § 403(a) is discussed in text accompanying notes
227-30 infra. The dissent in Park advocated a concept of liability based on negligence. 421
U.S. at 678-79 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Because of the strict liability nature of the Food and Drug Act, the prosecution in Park
did not have to establish that the individual's acts or omissions were either intentional or
negligent. Dotterweich liability arises, however, only when a corporate duty to act is imposed
by law. See text accompanying note 106 supra & notes 145-55 infra. Section 403(b), and not
§ 403(a), contemplates cases in which there is a corporate duty to act and should apply to
future Dotterweich-type prosecutions. Furthermore, the use in § 403(a) of the word "caused"
seems to require a "wrongful action," as the appellate court had suggested in Park. See text
accompanying notes 227-30 infra. In the absence of a duty to act, a failure to act, whether
the result of negligence or intention, probably will not produce liability under § 403(a). See
text accompanying notes 234-35 infra.
136. N.Y. PENAL LAw (McKinney) § 20.25 (1975) provides: "A person is criminally
liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the
name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed
in his own name or behalf."
137. 48 App. Div. 2d 223, 368 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1975).
138. The individual defendant was one of only three shareholders and was the only one
who actually participated in the business. Id. at 224, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 350.
139. Id. at 225-26, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
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the principle that a corporate official who directs employee conduct
that constitutes a criminal act is liable as an actor himself.
Because the Court in Park, relying on Dotterweich, emphasized
that the individual defendant was liable for "causing" the corporate
violation, a future Dotterweich-type prosecution could be brought
under section 403(a) on the theory that senior officials "caused" a
violation of the law by failing to prevent the corporation from com-
mitting it. 40 The goal of section 403, however, is to codify a more
precise identification of culpable individuals at various levels of the
corporate hierarchy than case law presently affords.' 41 Sections
403(b) and 403(c) provide the necessary guidance for proper identifi-
cation. The primary purpose of section 403(a) appears to be merely
the codification of the rule that individuals are responsible for their
conduct even when acting in a representative capacity. Section
403(a) offers little guidance in deciding how high in the corporate
hierarchy criminal responsibility should be imposed or how to iden-
tify responsible senior officials.'
B. Section 403(b)-Failure To Perform a Duty of an Organization
Section 403(b) of the Proposed Code provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever a duty to act is imposed
upon an organization by a statute, or by a regulation, rule, or order issued
pursuant thereto, an agent of the organization having significant responsibility
for the subject matter to which the duty relates is criminally liable for an
offense based upon an omission to perform the duty, if he has the state of mind
required for the commission of the offense, to the same extent as if the duty
were imposed upon him directly.
The Senate Judiciary Committee believes that section 403(b),
140. The Fourth Circuit in Park had held that, although the Food and Drug Act requires
no culpable state of mind, some act or omission is an essential element of every crime. The
court stated that, absent proof of Park's direct participation in the illegal conduct, the jury
on remand might find that Park's gross negligence and inattention in discharging his corpo-
rate duties constituted "wrongful action" which "caused" the contamination of the food. 499
F.2d at 841-42. See also text accompanying note 102 supra. The Supreme Court rejected the
Fourth Circuit's requirement of "wrongful action" or a minimal showing of negligence, hold-
ing that the failure of a responsible official to fulfill the corporate duty to prevent or correct
violations creates liability. 421 U.S. at 673-74. See also text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
141. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
142. The Proposed Code is vague in its use of the term "caused" in § 403(a). See text
accompanying notes 227-30 infra. People v. Dean, 48 App. Div. 2d 223, 362 N.Y.S.2d 349
(1975), suggests that § 403(a) would contemplate a direct instead of a remote causation; that
is, a participatory act by the defendant in a specific violation rather than culpability based
on his "causing" the various corporate functions. If the draftsmen of the Proposed Code had
included only subsection (a), the courts would have only Dotterweich and its progeny as
guidance for identifying the corporate managers who can fairly be said to "cause" corporate
misconduct. The inclusion of subsections (b) and (c) argues against stretching subsection (a)
beyond a mere restatement of the law concerning the defense of "representative capacity."
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in combination with section 403(a), "essentially covers and contin-
ues the teachings of Dotterweich."13 The language of the subsection
resembles the Park Court's articulation of Dotterweich liability,"
which emphasized that the culpability of responsible corporate
managers rests upon their violation of a statutory duty to discover
and remedy violations of the law within the corporation. Section
403(b) thus serves to identify those corporate officials who are not
the immediate criminal actors but who should nonetheless bear
criminal responsibility for certain corporate violations contem-
plated by the subsection. The precise application of section 403(b)
is unclear, however, as will be demonstrated by discussion of the two
key elements of the subsection: "duty to act" and "significant re-
sponsibility."
(1) Duty To Act
Section 403(b) applies only when "a duty to act is imposed
upon an organization by a statute, or by a regulation, rule, or order
issued pursuant thereto." Section 403(b) thus constitutes an ana-
logue to section 402(b) of the Proposed Code, which imposes crimi-
nal liability on a corporation when its agents fail to discharge "a
specific duty of conduct imposed on the organization by law."'45 The
effect of section 403(b) is to impose this corporate duty directly on
a responsible corporate agent, a step which avoids any conceptual
problems presented by holding an individual liable for the breach
of a duty imposed only upon the corporation." 6 A statute or regula-
tion may prescribe explicitly the duty of the corporation (and, by
virtue of section 403(b), of the individual agent) to act, such as a
duty to file a report or income tax return.'47 Dotterweich and its
143. COMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 75.
144. See text accompanying notes 105-07 supra. Park was decided after the basic formu-
lation of § 403(b) in S. 1 (1975), supra note 1, but the Senate Judiciary Committee considered
the impact of the case during its deliberations on § 403(b). See CoMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note
85, at 74 nn.85 & 88, 75 n.89.
145. See note 6 supra. Under § 111 of the Proposed Code, "conduct" includes both acts
and omissions. Under § 402(b), therefore, the duty of the corporation could include a duty to
refrain from acting. See COMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 73 n.77. Section 403(b), however,
refers only to a "duty to act." Arguably, a corporate duty tb refrain from acting will not
devolve upon an individual under § 403(b), although nothing in the legislative history of the
two subsections suggests a difference in the intended scope of the duty. Perhaps it is merely
a problem of characterization. For instance, if the Food and Drug Act imposes a duty on a
corporation to refrain from introducing adulterated foods into interstate commerce, the corpo-
ration also has a duty to take the necessary action to prevent violations of the Act. The
teaching of Park is that corporations and individuals have a duty to act. See also note 48
supra.
146. See note 48 supra.
147. See, e.g., People v. Strong, 363 111. 602, 2 N.E.2d 942 (1936) (duty to report collec-
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progeny, however, clearly indicate that a statute can impose duties
without expressly stating so.' For example, in United States v.
Parfait Powder Puff Co."9 a prosecution under the Food and Drug
Act, 110 the court observed that the corporation "owes a certain duty
to the public.''5 Park also relied on the Food and Drug Act's impo-
sition of a "positive duty to seek out and remedy violations. . . and
. . . a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations
will not occur."'15 2 However, the Food and Drug Act makes no men-
tion of any such specific duties.
The Senate Judiciary Committee noted that the duty to act
usually is associated with a statute imposing strict liability. 3 This
conclusion reflects the current notion that strict liability regulatory
offenses impose upon the corporation and its officers the duty to
insure the quality of corporate products and activities and to refrain
from conduct that would endanger public health, safety, or wel-
fare. 54
At least in the realm of statutes regulating activities posing
imminent danger to the public welfare, such as food and drug laws,
the prosecutor should utilize section 403(b) to identify culpable in-
dividuals in the corporate hierarchy, even though the statute vio-
lated does not specifically refer to a "duty" to act. Courts generally
will have to examine the purposes of the statutory scheme on which
tion of state fuel tax). The Model Penal Code, which contains provisions similar to §§ 402(b)
and 403(b), would cover violations of specific duties of affirmative action, and not offenses
such as negligent homicide, when the duty violated is one that the law imposes generally.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment 1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). S. 1400, supra note
1, contained an additional provision dealing with violations of a legal duty and providing that
a corporation was guilty of an offense if its agent failed to perform a "nondelegable duty of
the organization." S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 402(a)(1)(D) (1973). This provision was
apparently an attempt to codify rulings to the effect that the failure of an employee to carry
out a nondelegable duty will create criminal liability on the part of the corporation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938) (yardmaster's failure to insure that
cattle in transport were properly cared for, as required by statute, constitutes a corporate
failure to comply with the statute because it is a duty owed by the corporation to the public,
and neglect of employee is no defense). See also United States v. E. Brooke Matlack, Inc.,
149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957); 68 Nw. L. REv. 870, 878-81 (1973). The present Proposed
Code does not contain this provision. It is doubtful that the term "nondelegable" adds
anything to the duty to act.
148. The legislative history clearly demonstrates that § 403(b) has adopted the implicit
duties established by such cases. The Senate Judiciary Committee's discussion of § 403(b)
expressly approved Dotterweich. See COMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 75.
149. 163 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).
150. Only the corporation was prosecuted. Id. at 1009.
151. Id. at 1010.
152. 421 U.S. at 672.
153. CoMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 73 n.76.
154. See LAFAvE & Scmn, supra note 5, § 33, at 233; WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57,
at 188; Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958).
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the prosecution is based, as did the Court in Dotterweich and Park,
to determine if a duty is created requiring the highest standard of
corporate and individual diligence and care."'
Agencies regulating corporate activities may insure the availa-
bility of section 403(b) for future prosecutions by issuing regulations
explicitly describing the circumstances in which corporations have
a duty to act.'56 Without further guidance by either statute or regu-
lation as to the existence of a duty to act, however, courts will be
unwilling to allow prosecutions under section 403(b)," 7 and prosecu-
tors will have to resort to section 403(a), which offers little guidance
in identifying proper defendants,"' or to section 403(c), which re-
quires the prosecution to marshal evidence of a greater degree of
misconduct."19
Closely associated with the existence of a duty to act is the
possible existence of a constitutional requirement that individuals
convicted of failure to insure fulfillment of a corporate duty be
aware of the existence of that duty.' 0 In Lam bert v. California, "I the
Supreme Court held that a conviction under a municipal ordinance
requiring convicted felons to register violates due process when the
defendant had no knowledge of the duty to register and when the
prosecution made no showing of the probability of such knowledge.
Carefully limiting its ruling to laws penalizing a failure to act as
opposed to laws penalizing the commission of acts, the Court sug-
gested that a different result might follow if the failure to act occurs
"under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences
of his deed,' 62 or if circumstances might move an individual to
inquire as to his duty to act.'
3
155. 320 U.S. at 285. See also E.K. Hardison Seed Co. v. Jones, 149 F.2d 252 (6th Cir.
1945). Determination of a duty to act to prevent violations because of the dangerousness of
noncompliance with regulatory standards would be consistent with common law cases impos-
ing a duty to safeguard the public upon individuals creating a peril. See generally LAFAvE &
Scorr, supra note 5, § 26, at 186.
156. Section 403(b) applies to duties imposed by regulation as well as by statute. The
provision has been criticized because it fails to specify who might promulgate the rules and
regulations upon which liability may rest. See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. l, subpt. B, at
1635 (statement of Charles S. Maddock).
157. In cases dealing with criminal liability for omissions, most courts hold that the
existence of a legal duty to act is a question of law. Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal
Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 367, 369 (1965).
158. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
159. See text accompanying notes 211-15 infra.
160. Although § 303(d)(1)(A) of the Proposed Code specifically provides that proof of
knowledge of the fact that particular conduct is required by law is not necessary to sustain a
conviction, the Code, of course, must defer to constitutional requirements.
161. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
162. Id. at 228.
163. Id. at 229.
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Although section 403(b) punishes a failure of the defendant to
insure that a corporate duty is performed-a failure to act under
Lambert,-businesspersons will normally be operating under cir-
cumstances requiring them to suspect that regulatory statutes and
regulations exist, especially in industries engaged in activities that
concern or endanger public welfare."6 4 In United States v. Inter-
national Minerals & Chemical Corp.,"'5 a chemical company was
convicted for violating a regulation requiring that shipping papers
sufficiently describe hazardous materials. The Court rejected a
defense based on ignorance of the requirement, noting that the
"probability of regulation" in the corporation's industry was great
enough to presume awareness of the regulation.6 Although aware-
ness of regulations imposing a duty to act may or may not be
required by the Constitution, the issuance of widely publicized
regulations by regulatory agencies would serve the purposes of
establishing the existence of duties to act and insuring maximum
compliance through the awareness of all corporate officials af-
fected.6 '
(2) Significant Responsibility
When a failure by the corporation to perform a duty to act
imposed by law has been established, section 403(b) holds liable "an
agent of the organization having significant responsibility for the
subject matter to which the duty relates." This language has its
roots in the Model Penal Code, which holds an agent having
"primary responsibility" for the discharge of the duty liable for a
reckless omission to perform that duty.68 Early versions of the Pro-
posed Code 6' used the phrase "primary responsibility," which was
thought to narrow current law. 7' However, S. 1' and S. 1437172
164. Such industries are those upon which §§ 402(b) and 403(b) impose a duty to act.
See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
165. 402 U.S. 558 (1971). Justice Douglas authored both Lambert and International
Minerals.
166. Id. at 563-64. The statute's requirement of a "knowing" violation of the regulations
did not affect the outcome of the case. The Court held that "knowingly" refers only to the
requirement that the defendant knowingly acted; i.e., that he knew what he was shipping.
Id.
167. Many regulatory statutes require notice and comment rulemaking under § 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). See, e.g., Food and Drug Act § 701, 21
U.S.C. § 371(e) (1976); National Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
168. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 2.07(6)(b).
169. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, § 403(2); Criminal Justice Codification, Revision, and
Reform Act of 1974, § 403(b), reprinted in SENATE COM. ON THE JUDI IARY, 93D CONG., 2D
SEss., REPORT ON THE CRIsAL JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REVISION, AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, at
37 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as Jun. CoM. 1974 PMNT].
170. 2 Jun. COMM. 1974 PRINT, supra note 169, at 71.
171. S. 1 (1975), supra note 1, § 403(b).
172. Proposed Code, supra note 1, § 403(b).
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changed the terminology to "significant responsibility," perhaps
intending to broaden the scope of culpability.'7 3 The Senate Judici-
ary Committee admits that the "phrase is designedly rather amor-
phous, in order to leave to prosecutors, judges, and juries the basic
task of defining the class of persons who stand in such a relation to
an organization that criminal responsibility for its actions may
rightfully be imposed upon them."'74 A threshold issue in the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion, 7 5 therefore, is to identify the defen-
dants in the corporate hierarchy standing in "such a relation to the
organization" that they bear the responsibility for corporate crimes.
In consultations with the National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws, representatives of the Administrative Regu-
lations Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Jus-
tice stated that under official departmental policy, corporate prose-
cutions include individual defendants whenever they have a
"responsible and proximate relation to the violation," but that indi-
viduals in the lower echelons are not prosecuted when a responsible
individual higher up in the hierarchy can be found.'76 The case
precedent and legislative history of section 403(b) evidence a similar
view that lower echelon personnel without managerial powers are
not agents having "significant responsibility." Section 403(b) devel-
oped from strict liability statutes, which encourage effective man-
agement of corporate activities. 7 Section 403(b) attempts to induce
policymakers to implement procedures to prevent illegal corporate
activities. 78 To establish that an agent is significantly responsible
for the performance of a corporate duty, the prosecution should be
required to introduce evidence regarding the nature of the corpora-
tion and the defendant's duties and responsibilities within the cor-
poration, 79 and to demonstrate that the agent had actual authority
173. Other rationales for the change in language are discussed at note 257 infra.
174. Comm-rrrF PRINT, supra note 85, at 75. The Court in Dotterweich indicated a
similar reluctance to elaborate on the basis of liability. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
175. Draftsmen and legislators alike are concerned about the breadth of prosecutorial
discretion in the corporate criminal area. As Senator Roman L. Hruska observed during the
hearings: "After all, prosecutors are men and women just like anybody else. They can be
possessed of a liability of vindication in their souls, and maybe they will be frustrated in one
area and they will say, oh, but I got you now, I got you now." Subcommittee Hearings, pt.
X, at 7366.
176. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at 180. Proponents of the criminal provisions point
to government policy under the antitrust prosecutions to allay fears that widespread prosecu-
tion of innocent businesspersons will result from enactment of the Proposed Code. Ralph
Nader testified that suits were filed only in clearly established "per se" cases against individ-
uals who knowingly violated the law. Subcommittee Hearings, pt. H, subpt. D, at 2994.
177. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at 188.
178. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
179. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text.
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to insure proper discharge of the corporate duty.180
Proof concerning the nature of the corporation and its opera-
tions will ensure that the jury has an accurate and complete under-
standing of the management process within that particular organi-
zation. Such an understanding is crucial because various organiza-
tions employ different corporate decisionmaking models."8 ' For ex-
ample, the influence that an executive officer exercises over the
operations and conduct of a family-owned, close corporation will be
significantly greater than the influence of an executive officer in a
large, publicly-held corporation. 82 The nature of the defendant's
duties and responsibilities might be shown by corporate charters,
bylaws, and organizational charts,' 3 but tangible evidence of actual
individual responsibility rarely exists and may be misleading. 's
More reliable evidence would include testimony concerning the de-
fendant's daily activities on behalf of the corporation and the final-
ity of his decisionmaking powers.' 5 Finally, evidence should be ad-
duced to show that the defendant was in actual control and pos-
180. The Court of Appeals of New York, in applying a "substantial relationship to the
offense" test, sought to exculpate nominal officers who had no actual control over corporate
affairs by demanding that the defendants be in such a position that they presumably knew
or should have known of the violation and therefore should have taken steps to prevent it.
See People v. Trapp, 20 N.Y.2d 613, 233 N.E.2d 110, 286 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1967), discussed in
text accompanying notes 46-51 supra. As noted previously, numerous state and federal deci-
sions have charged corporate officials with constructive knowledge to find participation in a
corporate offense. See text accompanying notes 30, 37, & 81 supra. Section 403(b) emphasizes
the criminal liability for omission of a legal duty rather than participation in the offense, but
constructive knowledge may be important in cases requiring a showing of mens rea. See text
accompanying notes 191-98 infra.
181. See generally Note, supra note 98, at 1091.
182. See Lee, Corporate Criminal Liability (pt. 2), 28 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 194 (1928).
183. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kropf v. Gilbert, 213 Wis. 196, 251 N.W. 479 (1953), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
184. One court has observed:
In a large corporation, with many numerous and distinct departments, a high ranking
corporate officer or agent may have no authority or involvement in a particular sphere
of corporate activity, whereas a lower ranking corporate executive might have much
broader power in dealing with a matter peculiarly within the scope of his authority.
Employees who are in the lower echelon of the corporate hierarchy often exercise more
responsibility in the everyday operations of the corporation than the directors or officers.
Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275,275 N.E.2d 33, 83 (1971) (emphasis
by the court), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 910, 914 (1972).
On the other hand, senior officials might attempt to make "scapegoats" out of subordi-
nate agents by vesting them with "paper" authority, but in fact granting no actual power to
insure compliance with the law. See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. HI, subpt. D, at 3013
(Comment by Mark Silbergeld).
185. Lower-echelon managers who only make recommendations to superiors would not
be liable under this articulation. Section 403(b) contemplates officials vested with manage-
ment discretion.
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sessed sufficient authority to direct and control the conduct of sub-
ordinates.186
Section 403(b) further requires that the individual have signifi-
cant responsibility "for the subject matter to which the duty re-
lates." Thus the prosecution must demonstrate a connection be-
tween the corporate duty and the defendant's individual area of
responsibility. This language reflects the concern in Park that the
defendant have some responsibility for the offense beyond the mere
fact of his position within the corporation. 18 7 In United States v.
H.B. Gregory Co.'88 the offense arose from rodent infestation of a
warehouse. The individual defendant, who was president and treas-
urer of the company, had general responsibility for the operation of
the warehouse, but at trial the government presented testimony
emphasizing that the corporation specifically charged the defendant
with responsibility for rodent control problems.189 Such evidence
clearly is helpful in identifying the proper defendants.8 '
(3) State of Mind
Section 403(b) imposes liability on the individual defendant "if
he has the state of mind required for the commission of the offense."
Although Dotterweich and many subsequent cases discussed strict
liability offenses dispensing with any state of mind requirement, 1 ,
section 403(b) also imposes Dotterweich liability on individuals in
cases requiring an intentional, knowing, negligent, or reckless state
186. See text accompanying note 95 supra. See also United States v. Acri Wholesale
Grocery Co., 409 F. Supp. 529, 535 (S.D. Iowa 1976).
Of course, the sufficiency of proof on this point will vary according to the size and
complexity of the organization. Park serves as a guide to the type of proof to be adduced at
trial for a crime arising in a large corporate setting. See text accompanying notes 100-01
supra.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976) (judge instructed the jury that they must find that the
defendants occupied responsible positions related to the part of the business which caused
the adulteration). See also text accompanying notes 110-11 supra.
188. 502 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
189. Id. at 704.
190. The Senate Judiciary Committee points out that more than one individual may
be found to have "significant responsibility." See COMnTrEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 75. This
view raises the unpleasant possibility of unduly broad prosecutions encompassing several
corporate officials. The requirement that the criminal omission occur in the defendant's
specific area of responsibility will provide some protection against prosecution of several
managers at the same level of the hierarchy, unless it is clear that they share joint responsibil-
ity. A prosecutor and a jury could possibly select a proper defendant, however, and then go
higher into the corporate structure to .ensnare more defendants. Once the level of manage-
ment at which the necessary significant responsibility rests is established, "bootstrapping"
should not be allowed. See also discussion at notes 256-57 infra and accompanying text.
191. See text accompanying notes 72, 80-84 supra.
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of mind."' Thus, when a corporate offense occurs as a result of a
corporation's failure to act, the courts and counsel must consult
Chapter Three of the Proposed Code, which describes the culpable
states of mind, to determine if the corporate offense occasioned by
the corporate failure to act requires a particular state of mind.'93
Because statutes imposing a duty to act usually impose strict liabil-
ity,"4 situations in which there is a corporate duty to act as well as
a requirement for a culpable state of mind should not arise fre-
quently. If a culpable state of mind must accompany the failure to
act, however, section 403(b) imposes liability on the agent who has
not only the significant responsibility for the subject matter to
which the duty relates '" but also the state of mind required for the
offense."' The majority of cases dealing with corporate crime com-
mitted with a culpable state of mind, however, will not fall under
section 403(b) because of the absence of a corporate duty to act. In
such cases, sections 403(a)" and 403(c)'II will provide the means of
imposing criminal responsibility on corporate agents and their supe-
riors.
192. Section 301 of the Proposed Code provides for only these four states of mind. See
also note 212 infra.
193. Section 303(a)(2) provides that no state of mind must be proved with respect to
any element of an offense descibed outside of Title 18, or described in Title 18 as a violation
of a statute outside Title 18, or described in a regulation or rule issued pursuant to such a
statute, "if the description of the offense does not specify any state of mind with respect to
that element and the legislative purpose of the statute does not compel a contrary interpeta-
tion." Because most business regulatory schemes derive from statutes outside Title 18 and
the regulations issued pursuant thereto, most business offenses within the ambit of § 403(b)
will not require proof of a state of mind. See note 31 and text accompanying notes 153-55
supra. The corporation's omission to perform a duty to act, which is chargeable to the individ-
ual significantly responsible under § 403(b), probably will not require proof of a knowing,
intentional, reckless, or even negligent failure to act to prevent a violation. See notes 196 &
212 infra. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 5, § 2.07(6)(b) (holding that an agent
of the corporation having primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty legally account-
able for a "reckless omission to perform the required act"). The Proposed Code does not limit
liability to "reckless" omissions.
194. See note 31 and text accompanying notes 153-55 supra.
195. See text accompanying notes 168-90 supra.
196. For example, § 1401(a)(3) of the Proposed Code provides that a person is guilty of
an offense if, with intent to evade liability for a tax, he fails to account for or pay over taxes
withheld for wages. If an agent acting on behalf of the corporation fails to account for taxes
and possesses the requisite intent, the corporation incurs liability under the principles of §
402. See note 6 supra. The agent is liable under § 403(a). See text accompanying note 132
supra. Prosecution of the agent's superior would require a finding that the superior also had
the necessary criminal intent to accompany the omission of the corporate duty. If the superior
official did have significant responsibility for the proper filing of corporate taxes but did not
have the culpable state of mind, no liability would lie under § 403(b). A prosecution might
proceed, however, under § 403(c) for reckless failure to supervise adequately. See text accom-
panying notes 199-220 infra.
197. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
198. See text accompanying note 221 infra.
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C. Section 403(c)-Reckless Failure To Supervise Conduct of an
Organization
Sections 403(a) and 403(b) substantially codify present case
law by punishing individual conduct on behalf of the corporation
and by identifying proper defendants when a corporation fails to
perform an act required by law. Section 403(c), however, establishes
a basis for inculpating more corporate officials for more types of
corporate offenses than presently exists in federal criminal law."'
Section 403(c) provides:
A person responsible for supervising particular activities on behalf of an organ-
ization who, by his reckless failure to supervise adequately those activities,
permits or contributes to the commission of an offense by the organization is
criminally liable for the offense, except that if the offense committed by the
organizaton is a felony the person is liable under this subsection only for a
Class A misdemeanor.
The Senate Judiciary Committee remarked that criminal lia-
bility based on a failure to supervise is new to federal law and is a
"modest extension" of federal criminal liability;e in fact, such lia-
bility has been an unarticulated influence in both state and federal
cases dealing with individual liability for corporate crime. 2?' The
Committee intends section 403(c) to "place an affirmative duty to
exercise reasonable supervision on responsible supervisory person-
nel" to punish the "do it but don't tell me about it" attitude of
senior officials, and to establish "a basis for punishment of those
who could and should control the illegal activities of their subordi-
nates but choose instead to condone those activities. ' '202
199. Section 403(c), unlike § 403(b), does not require the existence of a corporate duty
to act.
200. CoMIrr PmNT, supra note 85, at 76. Opponents of the subsection called it a
"dangerous experiment of uncertain consequences." Subcommittee Hearings, pt. I, subpt.
B, at 1782 (statement of the National Association of Manufacturers).
201. See Belsinger v. District of Columbia, 436 F.2d 214, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also
note 37 supra and text accompanying notes 33-42 supra.
In Rizzo v. Goode, 4 3 U.S. 362 (1976), the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970) requires some evidence of an affirmative link between police misconduct and the
authorization or approval of the defendant city and police officials before liability will lie. In
dissent, Justice Blackmun cited Park as recent approval by the Court for "the imposition of
criminal liability without 'consciousness of wrongdoing' for failure to supervise subordinates."
423 U.S. at 385 n.1.
Prior cases sometimes remarked that the senior corporate officials were liable because
they knew or "should have known" of misconduct by agents. See Belsinger v. District of
Columbia, 436 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and cases at note 37 supra. Section 403(c) requires
recklessness, a much more demanding standard of culpability than prior case law has pre-
scribed.
202. ComurEz PRINT, supra note 85, at 75.
[Vol. 31:9651002
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
(1) Identifying Responsible Supervisors
Section 403(c) selects for prosecution "person[s] responsible
for supervising particular activities on behalf of an organization."
Much of the discussion of "significant responsibility" under section
403(b) is relevant to a determination of persons responsible under
section 403(c).201 As the Senate Judiciary Committee emphasized,
the target of the provision is the corporate official who should con-
trol the conduct of subordinate employees. Section 403(c) does not
refer to individuals with "primary" or "significant" responsibility,
however, and the pool of possible defendants culpable for a particu-
lar corporate offense is apparently larger under section 403(c) than
under section 403(b). In addition, when a statute imposes a duty on
the corporation that is not discharged, which invokes section 403(b),
liability for that offense could extend not only to the manager pos-
sessing significant responsibility but also to the lower echelon super-
visors responsible under section 403(c) for employees in that area of
corporate activity. Furthermore, the culpability of any individual
defendant under the provisions of sections 403(a), (b), or (c) auto-
matically could implicate that defendant's supervisor under section
403(c) for inadequate supervision of the lower echelon defendants.
Although the language of section 403(c) does not expressly prevent
either a "bootstrapping" procedure that could extend all the way to
the board of directors of large corporations or a broad prosecution
encompassing lower echelon supervisors, such expansive notions of
liability would be inconsistent with the goal of a more precise identi-
fication of corporate officials who should bear the responsibility for
corporate crime."' Prosecutions of lower echelon supervisors should
be initiated under section 403(c) only when the activities under their
control pose a particular threat to the general welfare and when the
need for individual deterrence is strong." 5 In the absence of such
considerations, section 403(c), like section 403(b), should be di-
rected only at upper echelon corporate officials who occupy posi-
tions in which reckless failure to supervise poses the greatest public
danger, and prosecution provides the greatest deterrence. Moreover,
in identifying only persons responsible for supervising "particular
activities on behalf of an organization," section 403(c) repeats the
203. See text accompanying notes 168-86 supra.
204. See text accompanying note 117 supra. When the defendant has made a proper
delegation, the language of § 403(c) may be read to prevent bootstrapping. See discussion of
the effect of delegation at text accompanying notes 258-60 infra.
205. Deterrence of individual misconduct is one of the twin goals of imposing individual
liability for corporate crime. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
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intent expressed in section 403(b) 216 to restrict the scope of liability
to defendants in the specific area of corporate activity giving rise to
the offense.207
(2) Reckless Failure To Supervise Adequately
Although the concept of criminal liability of corporate officials
stemming from reckless behavior has some precedent in federal
criminal law, 208 the concept of liability of high-ranking agents for
reckless failure to supervise and reckless mismanagement generally
developed in the course of civil litigation. In civil law, directors and
corporate officers are liable to the corporation and its shareholders
for injuries to the corporation resulting from their negligence in
management. Directors and officers must therefore use due care in
conducting the affairs of the corporation. One authority reviewing
the state and federal decisions concludes that an officer will be held
liable for failure to exercise the care required by the nature of the
corporate business, his own particular duties, and the time, place,
and circumstances in which he is expected to perform those du-
ties.209 Although the issue remains in conflict, considerable federal
authority holds that the degree of care required of a director in
managing corporate affairs differs from the degree of care he must
206. See text accompanying notes 187-90 supra.
207. The predecessor of § 403(c), § 403(4) of the Final Report, supra note 1, held a
person "responsible for supervising relevant activities" liable for a default in supervision
"within the range of that responsibility which contributes to the occurrence of that offense."
Because this language was criticized as overly vague, the drafters of S. 1 substituted the
phrase "particular activities." See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. III, subpt. B, at 163 (state-
ment of Charles S. Maddock); S. 1 (1975), supra note 1, § 403(c).
208. Substantial federal case law holds that criminal intent or wilful conduct may be
established if the defendant engaged in the conduct with reckless or indifferent disregard as
to the facts, or with a conscious intent to avoid learning the truth. For example, in Spurr v.
United States, 174 U.S. 728 (1899), the Court articulated the following rule in holding a bank
officer liable for falsely certifying checks: "[Elvil design may be presumed if the officer
purposely keeps himself in ignorance of whether the drawer has money in the bank or not, or
is grossly indifferent to his duty in respect to the ascertainment of that fact." Id. at 735. More
than "gross negligence" is required to establish culpability; the standard, although vague, is
closer to a showing of intent. The evolution of this standard is reviewed in Curnow, Economic
Crimes: A High Standard of Care, 35 FED. B.J. 21 (1976). Of course, § 403(c) does not require
criminal intent. The only state of mind required is recklessness. See text accompanying notes
212-15 infra.
209. See FLErCHER, supra note 4, § 1029. The standard, however, is far from clear:
In determining whether directors are liable for negligent mismanagement, the courts
have been prone to use fine-sounding phrases in defining the duties of directors, and then
proceed to decide the case without reference thereto-the rules laid down being such
glittering generalities that the case could be decided either way thereunder without
violating the rules.
Id. at 12. Although some courts require a showing of gross negligence, the general rule is that
want of ordinary care creates liability. Id. § 1034.
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take in his own affairs, that is, the care required is that of the
"ordinary director" rather than the "ordinary man. 210
Section 403(c) translates the civil liability of directors for
breach of a duty of adequate supervision owed to the corporation
into criminal liability for breach of a duty owed to the general pub-
lic. Indicia of a tortious failure to supervise gleaned from civil cases,
however, cannot be applied uncritically in prosecutions under sec-
tion 403(c). Both the language of section 403(c) and the legislative
history of the Proposed Code emphasize that criminal liability re-
quires a neglect greater than that producing civil liability.2 1" Section
403(c) requires a "reckless" failure to supervise adequately. Section
302(c) of the Proposed Code defines "reckless" as an awareness and
disregard of a risk that a circumstance exists or that a result of
conduct will occur.212 This risk, in turn, "must be of such a nature
and degree that to disregard it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a
situation. ' '213 The standard of recklessness in section 403(c) indi-
cates that the prosecution's burden is heavy, and fears expressed in
the legislative hearings concerning the expansiveness of such liabil-
ity seem unfounded .2 1  As pointed out by a proponent of section
403(c), the standard of conduct required is not rigorous, and if
American businesspersons do not meet the standard, section 403(c)
clearly is needed to compel effective supervision.215
Following proof of the corporate offense and identification of
210. Id. § 1038. Lower echelon supervisors who are neither officers nor directors are also
subject to § 403(c). See text accompanying note 204 supra. An "ordinary man" standard
might be more appropriate in such prosecutions. See text accompanying note 217 infra.
211. Courts often recognize that civil negligence differs from criminal negligence. See,
e.g., People v. Knapp, 206 N.Y. 373, 99 N.E. 841 (1912). The analogy is nevertheless made.
See State ex rel. Kropf v. Gilbert, 213 Wis. 196, 217, 251 N.W. 478, 485 (1933). See also note
201 supra.
212. Section 301(a) of the Proposed Code provides that a "state of mind" may be
pertinent with respect to conduct, an existing circumstance, and a result. Except as otherwise
provided in § 303(a), if the statute under which the defendant is charged does not specify
the required states of mind, the defendant's conduct must be "knowing," and he must be
"reckless" with regard to an existing circumstance or a result of his conduct. See Proposed
Code, supra note 1, § 303(b). Although § 403(c) seems to describe a state of mind with respect
to conduct (reckless failure), conduct is not defined by the Code as "reckless." See id. §
301(c). Therefore § 403(c) requires a showing of "knowing" conduct. See id. § 302(b)(1). As
to the existing circumstances or the results of conduct, a reckless state of mind must be
shown.
213. Id. § 302(c).
214. See generally Subcommittee Hearings, pt. I, at 71-76 (statement of Stephen Feld-
man), quoting Liebmann, Chartering a National Police Force (pt. 2), 56 A.B.A.J. 1176 (1970);
Subcommittee Hearings, pt. H, subpt. B, at 1635-36 (statement of Charles S. Maddock).
215. Subcommittee Hearings, pt. IU, subpt. D, at 3012-13 (statement of Mark Silber-
gard).
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the supervisors of the criminal actors, conviction under section
403(c) appears to require a two-step process. 2"6 First, the prosecution
must show that the defendant in fact failed to supervise adequately.
Civil analogues may be instructive here, such as the failure to adopt
generally approved systems designed to prevent misconduct by sub-
ordinates. 2 7 Second, the prosecution must show that the defendant
was aware that his failure would create a substantial and unjustifia-
ble risk of subordinate misconduct, and that he ignored that risk.18
At this second stage, the nature of the supervisor's duties and the
nature of the activities he supervises are critical. For example, in a
highly competitive business in which the temptation to engage in
illegal conduct is strong, executive officers in charge of salespersons
must be aware that circumstances are such that failure to supervise
adequately creates a substantial risk of subordinate misconduct.
Disregard of that risk creates liability under section 403(c) if subor-
dinate misconduct occurs.
Section 403(c) is the most innovative, and therefore most un-
certain, basis of individual liability for corporate crime provided by
the Proposed Code. Although it has been criticized for vagueness
regarding the standard of conduct expected of corporate execu-
tives,"9 section 403(c) requires only a minimal adherence to respon-
sible business practices and procedures.2
(3) Ameliorative Sentencing Procedures
Unlike sections 403(a) and (b), section 403(c) does not require
that the individual defendant possessed the culpable state of mind
necessary in the underlying offense. For example, subordinate
agents might commit a serious felony requiring an intentional state
of mind, but prosecution of their supervisor under section 403(c)
would require only a showing of his recklessness rather than in-
216. The necessity of proof of causation is discussed separately in text accompanying
notes 245-48 infra.
217. See FLAECHER, supra note 4, § 1076.
218. Recklessness under § 302(c) must include "conscious risk creation," but need not
include any desire that the risk occur. See CoMM1rr PRINT, supra note 85, at 56.
219. See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. I, subpt. B, at 1633-42 (statement of Charles
S. Maddock).
220. At least one court has upheld a statute imposing criminal liability for negligence
in business enterprises against a challenge of vagueness and failure to give notice of the
required conduct. In People v. Mancuso, 255 N.Y. 463, 175 N.E. 177 (1931), a criminal statute
applying a standard of the "same care and diligence that agents receiving a compensation
are bound. . . to observe" was held to give sufficient notice of the required duty of a director
of a moneyed corporation because the statute utilized common law standards that were well-
known to businesspersons. In view of the long civil history of liability for mismanagement,
the criminal provisions were deemed to be sufficiently precise.
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tent." ' However, section 403(c) imposes only misdemeanor sanc-
tions upon corporate supervisors, even though the underlying corpo-
rate offense resulting from the defendants' failure to supervise
might be a felony. 22 This ameliorative sentencing provision is in-
tended to reduce any harsh results that might flow from section
403(c)21 and indicates a congressional reluctance to impose the most
severe felony penalties on the basis of a liability new to the law and
as yet unclear in impact.
V. DEFENSES AND LIMITATIONS ON LL4BiTY"
For the individual defendant charged with responsibility for a
corporate crime, the Proposed Code denies more defenses than it
specifically grants. Section 404(b) provides that it is no defense that
the corporation has not been prosecuted or convicted;224 nor may the
individual defendant escape responsibility because the statute de-
scribes only corporations as the persons capable of directly commit-
ting the offense.2 21 Possible defenses articulated in the cases dealing
with individual liability, however, will survive adoption of the Pro-
posed Code,2 26 and a separate examination of such defenses will be
helpful in determining the contours of individual liability under
section 403.
A. Causation and the Park Defense
Although the issue of causation is present in all three subsec-
tions of section 403, only section 403(a), which holds an individual
liable for his conduct or conduct he "causes" in the name of the
organization, contains the verb "causes." The Proposed Code does
not define "cause," but the Senate Judiciary Committee has stated
that "causes" in section 403(a) carries the same meaning as
"causes" in section 401(a)(2).2 1 Section 401(a)(2) holds a person
criminally liable if, acting with the state of mind required for the
221. "Recklessness" differs from "intent" in that a reckless defendant need not have
desired the criminal result nor have had it as a conscious objective. See COaITTiE PRINT,
supra note 85, at 56.
222. A Class A misdemeanor carries penalties of up to a one year imprisonment and a
$10,000 fine. See Proposed Code, supra note 1, §§ 2201(b)(1)(B) & 2301(b)(6).
223. CoMmrTTUE PRINT, supra note 85, at 76.
224. Proposed Code, supra note 1, § 404(b)(1). See note 127 supra.
225. Proposed Code, supra note 1, § 404(b)(2). But see note 127 supra.
226. Proposed Code § 501 provides that, except as the Constitution or federal statutes
otherwise require, all defenses and bars to prosecution "shall be determined by the courts of
the United States according to the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
in the light of reason and experience."
227. CoMMrrE PRINT, supra note 85, at 75. Section 401 enunciates general principles
of accomplice liability.
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commission of the offense, "he causes the other person to engage in
conduct that would constitute an offense if engaged in personally by
the defendant or any other person. ' 28 "Causes" in section 401(a) (2),
in turn, retains its current case-law definition of "bringing about a
result that is reasonably foreseeable, through an agent, or by insti-
gation or procurement. ' 29 Causation in its current usage appears to
connote a deliberate or calculated manipulation of agents to pro-
duce a foreseeable criminal offense.23 0
Cases developing individual liability for offenses imposing
strict liability, such as Dotterweich and its progeny, applied a
broader concept of causation.2 3' To be liable for causing an adulter-
ated drug to travel in interstate commerce, for example, a senior
corporate official apparently need only have had a responsible posi-
tion in a business that regularly ships drugs in interstate com-
merce. 232 Section 403(a), however, appears to contemplate those in-
stances in a corporate setting when a senior official instigates the
corporate offense, or directs subordinates to commit a specific of-
fense in order to avoid personal criminal liability as an actor, or
operates a business as his criminal "alter ego" or instrumentality for
228. Section 401(a)(2) recodifies 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1976), which provides: "Whoever
willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an
offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal." The Proposed Code deletes
"willfully" because of the confusion caused by the term. See COMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note
85, at 68.
229. See id. at 64, 68 n.43.
230. See United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 443 (1917) (by submitting a false
insurance claim, the defendant "caused to be placed" in the mail a letter pursuant to a
scheme to defraud, in violation of federal law, because he knew that all claims were mailed
after approval by the superintendent); United States v. Maselli, 534 F.2d 1197, 1200 (6th Cir.
1976) (operation of a prostitution ring "causes" the interstate travel of prostitutes); United
States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 249 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310
(1969) (the defendant caused the illegal interstate transportation of counterfeit bonds even
though his agent was the party carrying the bonds across state lines).
18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1976), discussed at note 228 supra, "removes all doubt that one who
puts in motion or assists in the illegal enterprise but causes the commission of an indispensa-
ble element of the offense by an innocent agent or instrumentality, is guilty as a principal
even though he intentionally refrained from the direct act constituting the completed of-
fense." See 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (Revisor's Note) (1976).
231. Causation is a problem of proper attribution of criminal responsibility. As the
severity of the violation increases, the tribunal will be more willing to attribute blame even
though the causal relationship is not clear. See Frankel, Criminal Omissions: A Legal
Microcosm, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 367, 387-90 (1965).
232. Cf. discussion at note 81 supra (knowledge of the nature of the business is sufficient
to generate liability). Courts imposing liability for "causing" the shipment of adulterated or
misbranded food or drugs rarely discussed the "causal relation" between the defendant's
conduct and the violation. In United States v. H.B. Gregory Co., 502 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1974),
the court suggested that the finding of a "responsible share" mooted the defendant's argu-
ment of a lack of a "causal relation." Id. at 706. See also Lelles v. United States, 241 F.2d
21, 24 (9th Cir. 1957).
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conducting an illegal business.23 Thus a corporate officer charged
under section 403(a) could show that he did not in fact authorize,
direct, instigate, or otherwise "cause" the subordinate conduct or
the corporate crime. It is by no means clear that a senior official who
knows of misconduct but merely acquiesces in it incurs liability
under section 403(a). Of course, if the official has a duty to act
because of a statutory duty imposed on the corporation, he can be
prosecuted under section 403(b). In addition, section 403(c) could
apply to acquiescence cases because of the existence of a reckless
failure to supervise adequately. Nevertheless, state courts have held
corporate officials liable for "directing" a crime by acquiescence. 4
The target of section 403(a), however, appears to be the participat-
ing official; either section 403(b) or section 403(c) is the proper basis
of liability for "knowing but nonacting" 25 superior officials.
Dotterweich liability as codified in section 403(b) provides that
an agent significantly responsible for a corporate duty is liable for
an offense "based upon" an omission to perform the duty. Park
emphasized that, because Dotterweich liability rests on a duty to
act to prevent the offense, the defendant may come forward with
evidence showing that he was powerless to prevent or correct the
violation.2 31 In a recent case considering the "objective impossibil-
ity" defense, United States v. Y. Hata & Co.,237 the company and
its president were charged under the Food and Drug Act because of
bird infestation in the company's warehouse. Evidence showed that
defendant was aware of the problem and had intended to design a
wire cage that would enclose the warehouse. At the time of the
government inspection leading to the prosecution, however, the
233. See text accompanying notes 22-24, 56, & 134 supra. One case distinguished
"causation" in the Food and Drug Act from "causation" under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1976).
Palmer v. United States, 340 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1964). See notes 227-30 supra and accompany-
ing text.
234. See note 25 and text accompanying note 20 supra.
235. See CoMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 74.
236. 421 U.S. at 673. The Court said that the issue of "powerlessness" was "to 'be raised
defensively at a trial on the merits.' " Id., quoting United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse
Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91 (1964). The defendant probably does not carry a burden of establishing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, powerlessness as an affirmative defense. The presenta-
tion of evidence should force the prosecution to prove the nonexistence of the defense beyond
a reasonable doubt. See Proposed Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 25.1(a)(2) & (3), Title II,
pt. B, § 211 of S. 1437, at 295. In Park the Court stated that the defendant, if he presents
evidence, may request a charge that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant "was not without the power or capacity to affect the conditions which
founded the charges in the information." 421 U.S. at 676.
The Senate Judiciary Committee considers the objective impossibility defense to be of
"constitutional dimensions." COMMrrrEE PRINT, supra note 85, at 75 n.89.
237. 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
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materials for the cage had not yet arrived. In deciding whether the
evidence justified a jury charge concerning objective impossibil-
ity,23 8 the court noted that the defendant had discovered the prob-
lem in sufficient time to insure the receipt of materials and con-
struction of the cage. 239
The decision in Hata revealed an uncertainty created by Park's
discussion of "powerlessness." The individual defendant in Hata
argued that the objective impossibility defense should be available
to "anyone, organization or individual, offering to prove inability to
prevent or correct in timely fashion a violation despite maintenance
of the highest standard of foresight and vigilance.1240 The govern-
ment contended that the defense should be allowed only to the
corporate officer, not the corporation, and should apply only when
the officer is in fact powerless to prevent or correct the violation,
even by suspending the corporation's food warehousing activity if
necessary. 21 The defendant's interpretation of the objective impos-
sibility defense suggests that proof of the corporation's inability to
avoid violating the statute should provide a defense to strict liabil-
ity. The government's argument, on the other hand, suggests that
the objective impossibility defense should consider only the power-
lessness of the individual to control the corporate enterprise or to
correct corporate practices to prevent the offense. In light of the
goals behind imposing criminal sanctions on individuals in the cor-
porate hierarchy-deterrence of individual misconduct and encour-
agement of effective management practices to prevent public harm
by corporations2 2-the individual defendant should be allowed to
present evidence of his inability to effect corporate changes or to
fully control all corporate activity. Such evidence, of course, would
also be relevant in an attack on the required element of "significant
responsibility" under section 403(b) .243 In addition, the individual
defendant should present evidence tending to show that the corpo-
ration's compliance with the statute was impossible despite its best
238. See note 236 supra. The court used the standards established in entrapment cases
as a guide for determining if the evidence justified the charge; that is, "some evidence." 535
F.2d at 511.
239. Defendant knew of the problem in 1971, but did not consider the wire cage scheme
until the spring of 1972. 535 F.2d at 511.
240. Id.
241. Id. The court found it unnecessary to choose between these interpretations because
the individual defendant had failed to exercise the highest standard of diligence and would
therefore be liable even under his reading of Park. Id.
242. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
243. See text accompanying notes 168-90 supra. In Park the Court recognized that it
could be objectively impossible for a senior corporate official to control fully a corporation's
daily operations. 421 U.S. at 677 n.19.
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efforts. Although the corporation arguably should not escape liabil-
ity for a strict liability offense because of objective impossibility, use
of a criminal sanction against an individual who has made all possi-
ble efforts to avoid a violation serves neither of the objectives of
section 403.44
Causation is also a factor in section 403(c) because the prosecu-
tion must show that the defendant's reckless failure to supervise
adequately "permits or contributes" to the offense. Because section
403(c) reflects concepts of civil negligence in its reliance on reckless-
ness as a basis of liability,245 the issue of proximate cause may be-
come a focal point for the defense. Just as civil liability of corporate
directors must be predicated on a causal connection between the
negligence of the defendant and the resulting loss to the corpora-
tion, the prosecution under section 403(c) must show that the
defendant's failure to supervise was a proximate cause of the corpo-
rate offense. If the defendant's adequate supervision would not have
prevented or remedied the misconduct of subordinate employees, no
liability will lie under section 403(c). Furthermore, the burden and
allocation of proof under section 403(c) may be different from that
under section 403(b)'s objective impossibility defense, which re-
quires defendant to produce evidence showing insufficient causa-
tion.2 7 Because the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating proxi-
mate cause in civil cases, the prosecution likewise should carry the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the failure to
supervise at least contributed to the commission of the offense.2 14
The legislative history, however, is silent on the issues of causation
and the burden and allocation of proof.
B. Delegation
During the legislative hearings on the Proposed Code, critics
voiced concern that both sections 403(b) and (c) would deter the
delegation of authority by senior corporate officials who, because of
increased exposure to criminal liability for the actions of subor-
244. Although using penal sanctions against the corporation might produce the devel-
opment of new methods to insure compliance with the law, imposing criminal penalties
against individuals within the corporation could result in disproportionately harsh punish-
ment when the individual has performed to the best of his ability.
245. See text accompanying notes 208-11 supra.
246. The cases are collected in FLETCHER, supra note 4, §§ 1063.1, 1087, 1090.1.
247. See note 236 supra.
248. The test under § 403(c) is whether the failure to supervise "permits or contributes"
to the offense. "Contributes" seems to provide for broader liability than does "permits."
"Permits" suggests a "but for" test whereas "contributes" suggests the necessity of only
partial causation. Both words, however, mandate the establishment of a causal nexus.
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dinates, would be reluctant to allow managing agents discretionary
and supervisory powers. 249 Of critical importance to defendants in
the corporate hierarchy is the availability of a defense based on their
proper delegation of authority to subordinate officials.
(1) Delegation and Section 403(b)
An early commentator, citing state case precedent as authority,
asserted that when there is a failure to perform a corporate statutory
duty, the chief executive should "not be made the sacrifice for the
corporate sins" if he had properly delegated the responsibility for
performance of the duty.20 In McCollum v. State,25 1 the corpora-
tion's vice president in charge of a storage depot successfully de-
fended a pollution charge on the ground that he had properly dele-
gated responsibility for the operation and maintenance of certain
machinery to subordinates. The Court in Park, however, rejected
the defendant's argument that he had delegated authority for ware-
house operations to the local executive officer.252 The Ninth Circuit
similarly has rejected delegation as a defense to charges under the
Food and Drug Act.253
Because section 403(b) applies to statutes imposing special bur-
dens on corporate ventures to protect the public, 24 allowing the
defense of delegation could obstruct the goal of coercing affirmative
management action to prevent harm to the public. 2ss The defen-
249. See Subcommittee Hearings, pt. VI, at 5609-10; id. pt. III, subpt. B, at 1635
(statement of Charles S. Maddock). But see id. pt. I, subpt. D, at 3014 (in which Mark
Silbergeld argued that there could be no such effect because it is impossible not to delegate
in the modern corporation). See also id. pt. XI, at 7873 (statement of Ralph Nader).
250. Lee, supra note 182, at 187-88. If the duty has not been assigned, the liability
should rest upon those higher officers who have the duty to apportion the executive functions.
Id.
251. 165 Tex. Crim. 241, 305 S.W.2d 612 (1957), discussed in text accompanying notes
44-45 supra.
252. 421 U.S. at 664-65, 677. See also discussion at note 106 supra. Through letters from
the Food and Drug Administration concerning violations in both the Philadelphia and Balti-
more warehouses, Park knew that the sanitation systems were undependable, thus rebutting
his contention that he had relied justifiably upon subordinates to handle sanitation matters.
The fact that Park had notice that his delegation of responsibility was ineffective to insure
compliance with the law prevents a reading of Park that would foreclose delegation as a
defense in all cases. When the executive officer has no prior notice that his delegates have
not done their jobs, delegation should be a potential defense. See text accompanying note
256 infra.
253. United States v. Starr, 535 F.2d 512, 515-16 (9th Cir. 1976).
254. See text accompanying notes 153-55 supra.
255. See note 244 supra. The special legal burden of a specific statutory duty under §
403(b) would tend to militate against the delegation defense to a greater extent than does
the general duty of corporate supervision under § 403(c). See text accompanying notes 258-
62 infra.
1012 [Vol. 31:965
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
dant's proper delegation of responsibility for performance of the
corporate duty, however, would be extremely relevant to his proper
identification as the person "significantly responsible" for the duty,
especially when the defendant has no reason to believe that his
system of delegation is not adequate. 28 High-ranking officials might
remain "ultimately" responsible under traditional principles of cor-
poration law, but lower echelon managers to whom authority has
been delegated should be the officials "significantly responsible" for
purposes of section 403(b). 57
(2) Delegation and Section 403(c)
When a senior corporate official charged with a corporate of-
fense pleads that he properly delegated authority to a lower echelon
supervisor, serious doubts surround the defendant's proper identifi-
cation as a "person responsible for supervising particular activities"
under section 403(c). If a senior official properly delegates supervi-
sory responsibility, both the official and his delegate arguably are
"responsible, 258 but an appropriate application of section 403(c)
would inculpate only the delegate when a corporate offense results
from inadequate supervision of employees within the area of the
delegated responsibility. "Bootstrapping" defendants in successive
levels of supervisory authority would ignore the necessity of delega-
tion in a large corporation and would approach the imposition of
vicarious liability, which the Proposed Code seeks to avoid.259 In
addition, section 403(c) provides liability only for persons responsi-
ble for supervising "particular activities." Thus, the statutory lan-
guage of section 403(c) indicates that the provision is directed at the
delegates responsible for particular areas rather than higher officials
256. See note 252 supra. Allowing proper delegation as evidence of a lack of "significant
responsibility" lessens the danger of "bootstrapping" successive levels of management offi-
cials who have some contact with the subject matter to which the offense relates. See note
190 supra.
257. See text accompanying notes 168-90 supra. Changes in the language of § 403(b)
during its development support the view that the officials ultimately responsible are not
always subject to liability under § 403(b). Early drafts of the Proposed Code used the term
"primary responsibility." See notes 168-73 supra and accompanying text. One critic pointed
out that the directors are always "primarily" responsible for everything in the corporation
and thus would always be liable. Subcommittee Hearings, pt. m, subpt. B, at 1635 (state-
ment of Charles S. Maddock). The language was changed to read "significant responsibility."
Although the legislative history offers no explanation for the change, the above criticism could
have prompted revision.
258. Statutes and corporate charters and bylaws generally allow delegation of authority
by the board of directors as well as by officers and managing agents. Ultimate responsibility
for control and supervision of corporate activities, however, remains with the board of direc-
tors. See generally FLErCHER, supra note 4, §§ 494-504. See also note 257 supra.
259. See text accompanying notes 118-21 & 204 supra.
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ultimately responsible for all corporate activities.6 0
The fact that the defendant had delegated the supervision of a
particular corporate activity to a subordinate does not foreclose
other theories of liability under section 403(c). The impropriety of
the delegation in view of the attendant circumstances could be evi-
dence of a reckless failure by the senior official to supervise ade-
quately activities that are part of his general responsibilities. For
example, if a particular corporate activity creates a substantial risk
of illegal activity by subordinates in the absence of close supervision
by higher echelon personnel, any attempted delegation could repre-
sent a reckless abdication of the senior official's corporate responsi-
bility. In addition, although the supervision of the particular activ-
ity in question might properly be subject to delegation, recklessness
in the selection or supervision of the delegate could result in liability
for the senior official if corporate misconduct results.2  The prosecu-
tion's burden of proving recklessness under section 403(c), however,
will prevent frequent use of improper delegation as a theory for
liability. 262
C. Conduct Not Occurring in the Normal Course of Business
Many cases discussing the liability of corporate officials for the
misconduct of agents indicate that the violation of the law occurred
during the "normal course of business. 2 63 For example, in Belsinger
v. District of Columbia,64 the court held that the president of a
company could not be held liable for failure to supervise properly a
particular contracting job when the project was so small that it
would not have drawn his attention in the course of performing his
"normal responsibilities. ' 26 5 Because section 403 strives to deter in-
260. See text accompanying notes 203-07 supra.
261. Under civil standards of liability, directors must exercise reasonable care in the
selection and supervision of delegates. See generally FLErCHER, supra note 4, §§ 1067, 1070-
71, 1079. Park presented a situation in which a possible action could lie for reckless selection
and supervision of delegates. See note 252 supra.
262. See text accompanying notes 216-20 supra. In view of the standard of liability
imposed by § 403(c), one proponent of the subsection allayed fears expressed by critics during
the legislative hearings by pointing out that only "mindless" delegation that "exalt[s] re-
sults over methods" would produce penalties under § 403(c). See Subcommittee Hearings,
pt. XI, at 7873 (statement of Ralph Nader).
263. See, e.g., Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir.), aff'd on
other grounds, 323 U.S. 18 (1944); United States v. Laffal, 83 A.2d 871, 872 (D.C. 1951).
264. 436 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
265. Id. at 220. In Carolene Products, discussed at text accompanying notes 80-82
supra, in which the defendants were charged with the shipment of adulterated milk, the court
observed: "We do not here have the case of a corporation engaged in a proper and legal
enterprise with an occasional violation of Federal law resulting therefrom." 140 F.2d at 65.
In both Belsinger and Carolene Products the normal course of business was relevant to the
court's attempt to infer knowledge of the violations. See note 201 supra.
1014 [Vol. 31:965
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
dividual misconduct and encourage sound corporate manage-
ment, ' punishment of supervisors and managers for the miscon-
duct of employees acting in abnormal or unforeseeable circumstan-
ces would not serve the purposes of imposing individual criminal
liability. Belsinger properly recognized that proper allocation of
supervisory resources often reduces the opportunities to direct mun-
dane or minor transactions. In addition, high-ranking officials
should not bear criminal responsibility when the corporate offense
results from abnormal business conditions." ' The uniqueness of the
circumstances giving rise to the offense is also relevant to the de-
fense of objective impossibility under section 403(b) if the offense
occurred despite the best efforts of the corporate managers to con-
trol corporate activity. '
In a prosecution under section 403(c), the uniqueness of the
circumstances or the unforeseeability of the agent's misconduct
would be relevant to rebut a charge of reckless failure to supervise
adequately because "adequate" supervision suggests that an official
need only provide for reasonably foreseeable or common occur-
rences.6 ' In any event, a failure in supervision probably would not
have "permitted or contributed to" the commission of an offense
occurring in unusual circumstances because the supervisor would be
unprepared or unable to direct subordinates properly if he were in
fact exercising the minimal standard of supervision required by sec-
tion 403(c).20
VI. CONCLUSION
In discussing the contours of individual liability under section
403, this Note has not attempted to criticize the section's drafts-
manship or counsel against its adoption. The philosophy of liability
reflected in section 403 wisely avoids the imposition of vicarious
liability on corporate officials. The defendant's personal miscon-
duct, failure to act, or reckless failure to supervise invoke the sanc-
tions of the provisions. In addition, subsections (b) and (c) provide
a theoretical underpinning for punishing omissions that is prefera-
266. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
267. For example, a statute might require a corporation to act in a set of circumstances
that rarely arises in its normal business. Although § 403(b) would impose liability on a
responsible official for the corporation's failure to act, the extenuating circumstances militate
against imposing individual liability. The corporation, nevertheless, might be liable. See note
6 supra.
268. See text accompanying notes 240-44 supra.
269. See text accompanying note 209 supra.
270. See text accompanying notes 245-48 supra.
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ble to the indicia of artificial "participation" relied upon in former
state and federal cases.
This Note has also attempted to establish some limitations
against an expansive reading of section 403. The Proposed Code's
modest extension of individual criminal culpability is secondary to
its attempt to properly "locate the point [in the corporate hier-
archy] at which extended responsibility for various crimes reaches
optimum effectiveness and should, therefore, terminate."' 1 The
Proposed Code faces the challenge of properly identifying individual
defendants in a corporate setting. Prosecutors who select the defen-
dants and courts who adjudge the standards of liability will accom-
plish that proper identification by constant reference to the twin
goals of section 403-deterrence of individual misconduct and coer-
cion of affirmative management of corporate activity to avoid public
harm.
STEPHEN D. GOODWIN
271. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 57, at 183.
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